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ABSTRACT 
In its landmark decision in Carolene Products, the Supreme Court crafted a uniquely American solution to 
the counter-majoritarian dilemma present in any constitutional democracy: when unelected judges should 
substantively review policy choices made by elected legislators and executives.  The political process theory 
underlying that decision is that a court with a history of decisions based on judicial ideology should limit close 
review of  government actions to three situations: (1) when the action contravenes a specific provision of the Bill 
of Rights, (2) when the action threatens to improperly limit the political process, or (3) with regard to the 
broadly worded Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, when courts determine that the political process does 
not work normally.  The Supreme Court has not faithfully implemented this approach over the years.  However, 
neither Justices nor commentators have developed a superior alternative approach.  We believe that most 
Americans ought to prefer a return to Carolene Products, as superior (either philosophically or because of risk 
aversion) to leaving important constitutional precedents subject to the vagaries of highly partisan politics.  Our 
approach builds upon insights of Justices Harlan Fiske Stone, Robert Jackson, and Thurgood Marshall.  First, 
courts should consider challenges initially under the Equal Protection Clause.  Second, the category of cases 
warranting heightened judicial scrutiny should be expanded to include those in which claimants can prove that 
they are excluded from the Madisonian factional “wheeling and dealing” that characterizes ordinary politics.  
Third, substantive due process claims should remain available, but only where claimants can demonstrate that 
animus or prejudice precludes their ability to use the political process to redress their grievances. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental problem of American constitutional law has been 
popularly named the “counter-majoritarian dilemma.”  Coined by noted 
scholar Alexander Bickel, the problem arises because when the Supreme 
Court invalidates a legislative or executive act that, in the Justices’ judg-
ment, violates the Constitution, the decision “thwarts the will of representa-
tives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it.”1  This issue is theoretically 
present in any constitutional democracy.  However, the so-called “Lochner 
era” supplied a uniquely American problem for Justices, scholars, and theo-
rists to address.  Building over five decades, the 1930s saw a crisis in consti-
	
 1 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 17 (1962). 
May 2018]    POLITICAL PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, & SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 985 
	
tutional law where progressive social legislation enacted by a plainly majori-
tarian political process (ratified in the 1936 landslide reelection of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt) was being systematically invalidated by an ideologi-
cally divided Supreme Court.  Moreover, the Court’s majority was seen as 
imposing their own personal political and ideological preferences.2 
Over seventy-five years ago, a re-formed Supreme Court3 crafted a so-
lution to this dilemma in United States v. Carolene Products Co.4: the broadly 
worded Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments would ordinarily be applied with great judicial defer-
ence to legislation.  The Court rejected both a due process and an equal 
protection challenge to a federal law limiting the sale of a particular kind of 
milk.  The Court reasoned that: 
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not 
to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the as-
sumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.5   
However, in the Court’s famous Footnote Four (the most celebrated foot-
note in American constitutional law6), the Court noted important excep-
tions when reviewing legislation that impaired the political process.  Thus, 
“a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” might be required 
when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” existed that “tends 
	
 2 For a recent summary of this important period in constitutional history, see JEFF SHESOL, 
SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (2010).  Shesol quotes 
Washington Daily News columnist Ray Clapper: “President Roosevelt will not be thwarted through-
out his second four years by five or six members of the court who happen to hold a political phi-
losophy contrary to that which dominates the federal administration, most of the state govern-
ments, and more than 60 percent of the voters.”  Id. at 245. 
 3 The famous “switch in time that saved nine” that averted the constitutional crisis was the decision 
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).  In that case, Justice Owen Roberts, who 
had previously voted with the 5-4 conservative majority of the Court to invalidate New Deal legis-
lation in, for example, Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down a federal regula-
tion as to coal mining), split from his conservative brethren to join the majority in upholding the 
National Labor Relations Act.  By 1938, two of the conservative Justices, Willis Van Devanter 
and George Sutherland, had retired and had been replaced by Hugo Black (a New Deal-favoring 
senator from Alabama) and Stanley Reed (who had been President Roosevelt’s Solicitor General).  
David O’Brien, Reed, Stanley Forman, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 712–13 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); Tinsley E. Yarborough, Black, Hugo 
Lafayette, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, su-
pra, at 72–75. 
 4 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 5 Id. at 152. 
 6 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982). 
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seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities.”7 
Carolene Products is a solution to America’s unique need to limit active re-
view by a Court with a history of ideological interpretations of potentially 
unlimited concepts like “due process” or “equal protection.”  Its theory is to 
limit close judicial scrutiny8 to cases where courts determine that the politi-
cal process does not work properly.  This theory was extensively developed, 
at a general level, by John Hart Ely in his aptly named book, Democracy and 
Distrust.9  It was specifically applied by one of us, in Judicial Review and the Na-
tional Political Process, which argued that the political process works adequate-
ly to preserve the constitutional balance between the federal and state gov-
ernments, and between Congress and the President, but that federal and 
state courts should actively protect individual liberties that were threatened 
by the political process.10  As succinctly put by an international observer,  
[t]o the counter-majoritarian objection, the Footnote’s answer lies within 
the realm of the value of majoritarian legitimacy itself: the only statutes 
which can be truly legitimate are those which are the product of a genuine 
majority will and where no group is ignored merely because it lacks ade-
quate access to democratic decision-making.11 
The Court’s doctrinal consistency with political process theory, howev-
er, has been uneven.  Academics have subjected the theory itself to exten-
sive criticism.12  Today, the public discourse over “constitutional politics” 
largely ignores the political process approach.13  We believe this is unfortu-
	
 7 Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. 
 8 In this Article, we use the phrases “active” review or “close” scrutiny to describe any sort of non-
deferential judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation on due process or equal protection 
grounds, in contrast with the deferential scrutiny used under the rational basis test originally set 
forth in Carolene Products.  This Article focuses on when to forego deferential review.  Beyond its 
scope is the precise standard (e.g. “strict scrutiny,” “intermediate scrutiny,” “congruence and pro-
portionality”) that federal courts could use when closely scrutinizing legislation where it is appro-
priate to do so. 
 9 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 10 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). 
 11 Wojciech Sadurski, Judicial Protection of Minorities: The Lessons of Footnote Four, 17 ANGLO-AM. L. 
REV. 163, 166 (1988). 
 12 The two leading critiques written following publication of Democracy and Distrust are Laurence H. 
Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980), and 
Mark Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 
89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).  For an express restatement of this critique as part of a ten-year later 
symposium on Democracy and Distrust published by the Virginia Law Review, see Michael J. Klarman, 
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747 (1991) [hereinafter Klarman, 
The Puzzling Resistance]. 
 13 For a revealing examination of constitutional politics in this regard, see The Nomination of Elena 
Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
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nate.  The Court’s petrification of categories of heightened scrutiny since 
the 1970s satisfies neither the left, the right, nor academic theorists.  As 
others have noted, the academic criticism fails to offer any alternative supe-
rior to process theory.  Nor do critics acknowledge its potential to channel 
and reduce judicial policy preferences, even if process theory does not en-
tirely eliminate non-neutral judicial discretion. 
Most critically, we are troubled by what we describe as the new “consti-
tutional politics” that treats Supreme Court Justices no differently than 
elected or appointed officials who are directly or indirectly subject to popu-
lar control.  That is, those who want judicial protection against laws restrict-
ing women’s reproductive choices or LGBTQ equality, but favor legislation 
restricting corporate and financial power and affirmative action, urge voting 
for a presidential candidate who will appoint nominees that will accomplish 
these results.  On the other hand, voters on the other side of the political di-
vide support a candidate who will appoint Justices voting to overrule Roe v. 
Wade14 and Obergefell v. Hodges15 and maintain close and narrow scrutiny of 
	
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).  Each Senator gave an opening statement, virtually all complained 
about activism, and none referred to Carolene Products in their statements.  Democrats voiced their 
frustrations.  See id. at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (criticizing judicial activism in Bush v. 
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) and Citizens United v. FEC, 588 U.S. 310 (2010)); id. at 12 (statement of 
Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (criticizing judicial activism in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010)); id. at 17, 32 (statements of Sens. Russell Feingold and Richard Durbin) (criticizing Citizens 
United); id. at 26–27 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (complaining about a litany of conserva-
tive judicial activism); id. at 36–37 (statement of Sen. Ben Cardin) (praising a variety of Warren 
Court cases and later decisions protecting against “abuses of power, particularly by an overreach-
ing government,” while criticizing conservative decisions in Citizens United and a number of statu-
tory cases where he argued the Court had reversed Congress’s “clear intent”); id. at 40 (statement 
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse) (criticizing judicial activism in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008)); id. at 46 (statement of Sen. Edward Kaufman) (criticizing conservative majority for disre-
garding “settled law and Congressional policy choices in order to promote business interests at the 
expense of the people’s interest”); id. at 48 (statement of Sen. Al Franken) (noting, explicitly, con-
servative complaints about judicial activism, but noting that Justice Thomas has voted to overturn 
more federal laws than Justices Stevens and Breyer combined).  Republicans also voiced com-
plaints.  See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (complaining about Warren Court activism 
but noting gun rights hang on a single vote); id. at 14 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley) (empha-
sizing that a judge should lack “an agenda to impose his or her personal politics and preferences 
from the bench”); id. at 20 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (criticizing nominee’s memos as a Supreme 
Court clerk, which expressed concern that the Court would cut back on abortion rights or rights 
of accused under the exclusionary rule); id. at 28–29 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (distinguish-
ing, expressly, a “traditional” and “activist” vision of judges, noting that expansive criminal re-
view is “activist” whereas the McDonald gun rights decision was “traditional”). 
The only reference to Carolene Products in the entire hearing appeared in a colloquy, when 
Senator Franken suggested that Justice Thurgood Marshall’s jurisprudence on racial justice was 
grounded in that landmark precedent, and Justice-designate Kagan responded without agreeing 
or disagreeing with the suggestion.  Id. at 291. 
 14 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 15 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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congressional efforts to protect minority voting rights.  American lawmakers 
understand constitutional politics; this explains why senators on the right 
and the left preserve the filibuster even when it may harm their short-term 
political interests.  It is common in both constitutional politics (as with free 
speech) and ordinary politics (as with the Senate filibuster) for Americans 
and their officials to favor doctrines that may disadvantage them in the 
short-run, principally to protect their own interests in the long-run.  While 
some Americans may prefer a Supreme Court of like-minded Justices willing 
to implement their own policy preferences, we believe it is wiser to prefer an 
alternative strategy because of a fear that the same process may result in a 
Supreme Court ready to implement opposing preferences.16   
In light of the unpredictability of contemporary politics, and because of 
a proper understanding of our Constitution’s system of separation of pow-
ers, we believe that most Americans should echo this longer-term approach 
exemplified by Carolene Products.  That is, constitutional doctrine should 
channel fights about wise social policy to the legislative and executive 
branches unless there is some objective structural failure (i.e. a failure more 
than simply an unwillingness to adopt wise social policy). 
In today’s vernacular, then, we seek to “double down” on the approach 
of Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, a Republican who served as President Coo-
lidge’s attorney general before his nomination to the bench, but whose ju-
risprudence led to his elevation to Chief Justice by President Roosevelt.  In 
so doing, we argue for the significant expansion of process-based review 
under equality principles, based on the insights of Justice Robert Jackson, 
President Roosevelt’s attorney general before his nomination (and mentor 
of William Rehnquist), and the legendary Justice Thurgood Marshall.  Spe-
cifically, we argue for a reinvigorated use of political process theory as a 
principled basis for extending close judicial scrutiny to additional categories 
of claimants, and to do so primarily under the Equal Protection Clause.  In 
our view, Justice Jackson correctly observed that few rights not expressly 
protected in the Bill of Rights will be infringed if courts preclude discrimi-
natory treatment.  Properly analyzed, most claims for heightened scrutiny 
would be resolved under equality principles.  We argue for retention of ju-
dicial protection of substantive claims under the Due Process Clause only in 
the special case of claimants whose rights are abused because of political 
animus or prejudice toward a type of conduct. 
	
 16 The literature seems to underplay this motivation for judicial restraint.  See, e.g., David A. Strauss, 
Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1254 [hereinafter Strauss, Carolene 
Products] (discussing the Court’s transition from reviewing social welfare legislation).  Lochner 
abandonment can be explained either by recognition of the Court’s lack of expertise in economic 
matters or in the Court’s “capitulating to the inexorable demands of the interest group state.”  Id. 
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In Part I, we briefly review the major criticism of process theory and 
synthesize the academic responses.  In Part II, we detail the Court’s 
inconsistent reliance on Carolene Products jurisprudence.  We note the Court’s 
reliance on political process theory to reject heightened scrutiny in certain 
equal protection contexts, but its failure to seriously engage with process 
theory regarding substantive due process.  Specifically, we critique the 
Court’s disinclination to properly apply in equal protection jurisprudence the 
implied Madisonian insights of Justice Stone’s famous footnote.  In Part III, 
we set forth several doctrinal proposals, building on powerful and under-
appreciated insights of Justice Jackson’s Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York 
concurrence17 and Justice Marshall’s City of Mobile v. Bolden dissent.18  Jackson 
argued that courts should prefer to exhaust equal protection analysis before 
considering substantive due process claims; Marshall articulated a principled 
difference between the ordinary political losses of a minority group on any 
given issue and the systemic inability of a group to participate in the pluralist 
factional bargaining that is the foundation of the Republic designed by the 
Framers (most notably James Madison19).  These insights, we suggest, result 
in a more rigorous application of process theory to equal protection claims.  
Although this reinvigoration of Carolene Products should adequately resolve 
most claims, heightened judicial scrutiny should remain available under the 
Due Process Clauses when claimants can demonstrate, with regard to the 
exercise of those rights they claim to be “fundamental,” that animus or 
prejudice precludes their ability to participate equally in the political process 
with other stakeholders.  In Part IV, we apply this reinvigorated process-
based doctrine to a variety of contentious constitutional issues. 
I.  A “CHURCHILLIAN” DEFENSE OF PROCESS THEORY 
We readily concede that critics of academic process-based jurisprudence 
have debunked the notion that process theory guides judges to decide diffi-
cult constitutional cases in a manner wholly void of substantive judicial 
preferences.20  Our claim is more modest: a process-based jurisprudence for 
interpreting the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses is superior to 
the alternatives.  Judges inevitably must rely on insights from other disci-
plines to decide difficult cases.  For example, originalism requires Justices to 
act as amateur historians.21  Those who explicitly argue for particular sub-
	
 17 Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 18 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 103 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 19 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 20 For a more extensive understanding of their criticisms, see commentators cited in supra note 12. 
 21 See, for example, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), where the majority and 
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stantive content generally ask Justices to act as amateur moral philoso-
phers.22  Our approach, we concede, asks Justices to act as amateur political 
scientists.  We explain why we prefer that role. 
A.  Original Intent and Textualism 
Both the Court and commentators have properly rejected both original-
ism and textualism as effective approaches for interpreting the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses in a manner that minimizes the counter-
majoritarian dilemma.  The Court’s first effort to interpret the indetermi-
nately worded Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses came in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.23  There, the majority suggested that the Due Process 
Clause might (as its wording literally suggests) be limited to procedural er-
rors, and that the Equal Protection Clause directly barred only discrimina-
tion against Americans of African descent.24  This approach has never been 
followed.  Indeed, since then the Court has never held, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that only rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution were 
entitled to judicial recognition.25   
The plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey26 and the recent ma-
jority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges27 both rejected the notion that the coun-
ter-majoritarian dilemma can be resolved by resorting to a historical exege-
sis of whether the drafters of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses 
intended that the challenged law or practice be struck down.  This rejection 
is also implicit in extending the Equal Protection Clause to gender discrim-
ination,28 and in refusing to recognize a due process right to physician-
assisted suicide based on “history, legal traditions, and practices.”29 
	
principal dissent each engaged in an extensive historical inquiry into the origins of the Second 
Amendment. 
 22 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 12, at 1044. 
 23 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 24 Concluding that the broad language of the Clause was not limited solely to this sort of discrimina-
tion, Justice Samuel Miller suggested that the Clause might have broader force if Congress, exer-
cising its power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, added what today we might 
call additional suspect classes.  Id. at 81 (declining to rule on the applicability of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause outside the context of anti-Black discrimination until such time as “Congress shall 
have exercised its power”). 
 25 David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 380 (2003). 
 26 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) (declining to allow the state to impose “its own vision 
of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our 
culture”). 
 27 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (due process includes “most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights” and also “certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy”). 
 28 Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1872) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a 
woman’s exclusion from the Illinois bar), with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976) (ac-
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Moreover, both originalism and textualism freeze the Constitution and 
the role of the Court in protecting individual rights, and no Justice who has 
advocated this approach has ever secured a majority in agreement.30  In 
addition, this approach is somewhat inconsistent with the landmark deci-
sion in Bolling v. Sharpe,31 desegregating District of Columbia public schools 
(under the Due Process Clause) although those schools were racially segre-
gated when Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment.   
The Supreme Court’s one-person/one-vote decisions32 are also con-
sistent with Carolene Products, and demonstrably inconsistent with reliance on 
textualism and originalism.  Reapportionment schemes that favor a minori-
ty of voters seem precisely the sort of legislation undeserving of judicial def-
erence contemplated by the second paragraph of Footnote Four.  Yet there 
are very strong textual arguments (Section Two of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment itself contains a remedy for malapportionment) against direct judicial 
intervention.  Moreover, there is no plausible argument that drafters, ratifi-
ers, or voters understood the amendment to outlaw malapportionment.33 
Early in the Lochner era, noted constitutional scholar James Bradley 
Thayer suggested that the Court adopt the extremely deferential “clear 
mistake” rule, limiting judicial invalidation of popularly-enacted statutes.34  
The Court has not followed this path either. 
	
cording heightened scrutiny to sex-based classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
688 (1973) (plurality opinion) (contrasting the historical maltreatment of women in American law, 
epitomized in cases like Bradwell, with more contemporaneous advances in woman’s rights).  But 
see Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
101 (2011) (mounting an originalist defense of the principle that the Constitution prohibits invidi-
ous sex discrimination). 
 29 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997). 
 30 Even originalist approaches do not claim that due process and equal protection scrutiny is limited 
to those practices specifically intended to be barred by the Drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  Rather, originalist Judges have used language demanding evidence by the claimant 
that the asserted right has been “traditionally protected.”  See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (“It is at least true that 
no ‘substantive due process’ claim can be maintained unless the claimant demonstrates that the 
State has deprived him of a right historically and traditionally protected against state interfer-
ence.”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“In an attempt to 
limit and guide interpretation of the Clause, we have insisted not merely that the interest denomi-
nated as a ‘liberty’ be ‘fundamental’ (a concept that, in isolation, is hard to objectify), but also that it 
be an interest traditionally protected by our society.”).  These concerns are best seen as related to 
the approach limiting close review to interests “rooted” in “tradition,” discussed in Subpart I.C. 
 31 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
 32 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (holding that unequal apportionment of the 
population’s in-state districts violates the Equal Protection Clause). 
 33 Strauss, Carolene Products, supra note 16, at 1260. 
 34 See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. 
REV 129, 140–51 (1893).  Thayer quoted favorably from an early decision by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court: 
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Whatever the benefits of an historical approach in theory, the Justices’ 
actual record when assuming the role of amateur historian to interpret 
broad constitutional text in a manner designed to effectuate the 
expectations of those who drafted and ratified the relevant text provides 
another cautionary tale against originalism.  As a prominent constitutional 
historian has observed, “[T]he ideal of ‘unbiased’ history remains an elusive 
goal, while the notion that the Constitution had some fixed and well-known 
meaning at the moment of its adoption dissolves into a mirage.”35  All nine 
members of the Court recently explored the history of the right to possess 
firearms, deeply immersing themselves in the drafting and ratification of the 
Second Amendment.  Yet the Court still divided on traditional 5-4 
ideological lines.36  Indeed, when the views of lower court judges are added, 
we see little to commend history as a neutral basis for resolving the most 
difficult cases.37  Perhaps the current apex of constitutional decisions, Brown 
	
For weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle in constitutional construction by 
the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and every other court of reputa-
tion in the United States, that an Act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless 
the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. 
  Id. at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (Pa. 1811)). 
 35 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 6 (1996).  One of us has previously addressed the difficulties of original interpre-
tation in the context of the Religion Clauses.  JESSE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 2–5 (1995) 
[hereinafter CHOPER, LIBERTY]. 
 36 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment to 
the states); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (guaranteeing the right to possess a 
gun for self-defense). 
 37 To take one prominent recent example, consider the treatment of recess appointments made by 
the President under Article II, Section Two of the Constitution.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 
(enabling the President “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Sen-
ate”).  In 2013, a unanimous panel of the D.C. Circuit (all Republican appointees) relied on his-
torical analysis to rule several such appointments made by President Obama unconstitutional be-
cause “the Recess” supposedly originally referred only to intersession recesses (those occurring 
between the two sessions of Congress) and the challenged appointments occurred during an in-
trasession recess (occurring within a single session of Congress).  See Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 
490, 512 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  Prior to Canning, such intrasession recess appointments had been up-
held by the Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224–25 (11th. Cir. 2004) (en 
banc).  There, the challenged appointment was made by President Bush, and the dissenting judg-
es (contending that the appointment was unconstitutional) were both Democratic appointees.  Id. 
at 1228 (Barkett, J., dissenting); id. at 1238 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
Following the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, several other appellate courts jumped into the fray 
and broke down on predictable partisan lines.  See, e.g., NLRB v. Enter. Leasing Co. Se., LLC, 
722 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 2013) (deciding, 2-1, to invalidate the recess appointments, with majority 
judges both being Republican-appointees and the dissenting judge being a Democratic-
appointee); NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2013) (deciding, 2-1, to 
invalidate the recess appointments, with majority judges both being Republican-appointees and 
the dissenting judge being a Democratic-appointee); NLRB v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc., 734 
F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2013) (declining, in an opinion authored by a Democratic-appointee, to con-
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v. Board of Education, got it right in concluding that, in the difficult cases 
before it, history is “inconclusive.”38 
B.  Rooted in Tradition 
The Supreme Court has from time to time suggested that the Due Pro-
cess Clause ought to protect rights not specified in the Bill of Rights that 
were “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.”39  Many important decisions, however, explicitly 
reject this doctrinal limit.  Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the majority 
declared: “History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry but do not 
set its outer boundaries.”40   
The reference to a criterion of “rootedness” in “tradition” originated in 
dicta in a Lochner-era case.41  However, it was given new life in Justice Arthur 
Goldberg’s Griswold v. Connecticut concurrence to justify careful scrutiny of 
state laws intruding on marital privacy concerning contraception.42  Later, a 
majority adopted the phrase in a leading case constitutionalizing family law, 
	
sider a recess appointments clause challenge due to waiver, with a Republican-appointee judge 
dissenting and urging that the challenged appointments are unconstitutional).  The lone exception 
to “party discipline” was the decision by Judge Roger Wollman of the Eighth Circuit, an appoin-
tee of President Reagan, to join his Democratic colleague in RELCO Locomotives in holding that the 
employer’s challenge to NLRB recess appointments was untimely.  Id. at 769.  Even here, this ex-
ception may prove the rule.  See Lawrence L. Piersol, In Dedication, 46 S.D. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) 
(opining that Judge Wollman was appointed by President Reagan “based only upon merit” and 
“despite his total lack of political influence or connections”). 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the four Democratic-appointees on the Court, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, all held that such intrasession recess appointments were constitutional 
(albeit affirming the D.C. Circuit on other grounds).  NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2568 
(2014).  The four remaining Republican-appointees wrote separately and argued that the ap-
pointments were unconstitutional.  Id. at 2592 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 38 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). 
 39 This phrase originates in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).  The Court affirmed a 
murder conviction over claims that the defendant’s due process rights were violated because he 
was not present when the trial judge, jury, and counsel visited the scene of the crime.  Id. at 105–
06.  The case solely involved procedural due process, specifically an interpretation of the applica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty to rights arguably protected by the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to a fair trial.  See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993) (analyz-
ing whether immigration procedures, applied to detained immigrant juveniles, offended due pro-
cess rights that were deeply rooted in tradition).  
 40 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015).  The opinion cites a similar proclamation in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process inquiry”), which in turn quoted Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857–58 (1998) (rejecting claim that police 
were liable for injuries to passenger on motorcycle whose driver was object of high-speed chase). 
 41 See supra note 39. 
 42 381 U.S. 479, 486–96 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
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Moore v. City of East Cleveland.43  There are two major problems with using the 
criterion of “rootedness” in lieu of demonstrable defects in the political pro-
cess to justify close judicial scrutiny of substantive due process claims.   
First, anchoring due process doctrine in “rooted traditions” is certainly no 
answer to America’s unique “counter-majoritarian dilemma” that gave rise to 
Footnote Four.  Many of the New Deal’s harshest critics grounded their oppo-
sition to progressive social welfare legislation on the ground that among the 
liberties that were “deeply rooted” in American tradition was laissez-faire free-
dom from industrial regulation.  Indeed, this was the case in Lochner itself.44 
Second, such a test is neither workable nor analytically sound.  Almost 
any current individual rights claim can be stated at such a degree of preci-
sion that claimants would find it almost impossible to demonstrate the 
claim’s roots (interracial marriage was widely barred).  On the other hand, 
the same claim can be restated at a degree of generality that could encom-
pass almost anything (interracial marriage is rooted in a long-recognized 
tradition of personal autonomy).45   
The majority’s reliance on “roots” in the twin 1997 decisions concern-
ing physician-assisted suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg46 and Vacco v. Quill,47 
illustrates these problems.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in 
Glucksberg emphasized the need in substantive due process cases to examine 
“our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”48  Noting (1) seven 
centuries of Anglo-American common law tradition to punish assisted sui-
cide,49 (2) the adoption of the common law approach barring assisted sui-
	
 43 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1977).  Other cases invoking this concept include Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 122–31 (1989) (denying parental rights to a biological father after the presumptive father 
at birth exercised substantial responsibility), and Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 
(1997) (rejecting claimed right of terminally-ill patient to physician-assisted suicide).  In addition, 
the Court has explored whether a claimed right is “rooted” in “tradition” in the context of whether 
to apply specific provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states, see McDonald, 561 U.S. at 760–77 (ap-
plying the right to bear arms for personal self-defense), other claims regarding police practices, see, 
e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171–72 (1952) (rejecting involuntary stomach pumping of 
a suspect as beyond pale consistent with traditions), and other procedural due process contexts, see, 
e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 69–75 (2009) (rejecting the right to access to 
evidence for DNA testing in post-conviction proceedings, absent congressional action). 
 44 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (“The general right to make a contract in relation 
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 45 Neither of these arguments were dispositive in the Court’s holding that state laws interfering with 
interracial marriages were inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 46 521 U.S. at 710. 
 47 521 U.S. 793, 800–01 (1997). 
 48 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710. 
 49 Id. at 711. 
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cide by the Colonies,50 (3) the statutory criminalization of assisted suicide 
dating to 1828,51 and (4) the general reaffirmance after reexamination of 
these bans,52 the majority found that a right to assisted suicide was not 
deeply rooted in history and tradition.53 
One difficulty with this reasoning is that Lochner, with the exception of 
the fourth point about recent affirmation, established that the right to con-
tract with workers for low wages and long hours is deeply rooted in history 
and tradition.54  In light of its focus on “rootedness,” it is not clear why the 
Glucksberg majority mentions, but does not explain the significance of, its 
conclusion that “the States are currently engaged in serious, thoughtful ex-
aminations of physician-assisted suicide and other similar issues.”55  Sup-
pose that the evidence had been, to the contrary, that the States had “let 
sleeping dogs lie” without any serious reconsideration of the issue?  Or sup-
pose legislative debates showed that recent examinations were not “serious” 
or “thoughtful”?  These problems illustrate our preference for a political 
process approach to a historic inquiry into “rootedness.” 
Glucksberg argued that an approach anchored to a criterion of “deep 
roots” is one that “tends to rein in the subjective elements that are necessari-
ly present in due process judicial review.”56  To the contrary, this approach 
would mainly satisfy those result-oriented individuals whose policy prefer-
ences favor the petrification of existing Court doctrine.  Others may find this 
an acceptable, albeit unprincipled, half-loaf.  However, the Court’s prece-
dents regarding interracial marriage, abortion, and personal sexual intimacy 
cannot meet this demanding historical test.  Nor does the majority’s reason-
ing provide a principled understanding of Lochner’s widespread rejection.  If 
the Court is justified in refusing to closely review economic due process 
claims, it cannot allow challengers the opportunity to obtain heightened 
scrutiny by showing that their practices are “rooted in history and tradi-
tion.”  To do so requires a willful failure to recognize that New Deal regula-
tions constituted unprecedented interference with free markets in violation 
of practices deeply rooted in our pre-industrial free market society.   
Glucksberg also demonstrates the problem with articulating a “rooted 
tradition” with a workable level of specificity.  The majority sought to dis-
tinguish the plurality opinion reaffirming abortion rights in Casey.  It 
	
 50 Id. at 712. 
 51 Id. at 715. 
 52 Id. at 716–18. 
 53 Id. at 723. 
 54 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
 55 521 U.S. at 719. 
 56 Id. at 722. 
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claimed that Casey protected “those personal activities and decisions that 
this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our history or traditions, or 
so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty” that they 
warranted close scrutiny.57  On the one hand, the actual practice of abor-
tion was not permitted in the nineteenth century.  On the other hand, a 
general right of personal and marital autonomy was well-recognized.  The 
actual practice of physician-assisted suicide was likewise not permitted, but 
personal bodily autonomy was.  All this fails to rein in subjectivity.58   
Finally, reliance on roots means that courts should actively protect the 
claims of Tommie Granville to limit the visitation rights of her children’s 
biological grandparents because parental powers are rooted in tradition.59  
Yet because public education is not “rooted in tradition,” this approach 
means that federal judges should refuse the claims of Demetrio P. Rodri-
guez for some genuine justification for why his children’s public school edu-
cation was so impoverished relative to the public schools of San Antonio’s 
affluent suburbs.60  These examples make it difficult to find a theoretical or 
practical justification for this approach. 
C.  Open-Ended Proportionality Review 
Justices John Marshall Harlan and David Souter have articulated an al-
ternative that does not as much respond to the counter-majoritarian di-
lemma as to reject or minimize it.  The approach was first articulated in 
Harlan’s famous dissent to Griswold’s predecessor, Poe v. Ullman.61  In his 
Glucksberg concurrence, Souter expounded upon Harlan’s dissent.  Their 
position has three key components.  First, the Court is obligated to continue 
its long tradition of reviewing the substantive content of legislation.62  Sec-
ond, this review does not identify “extratextual absolutes” but rather re-
	
 57 Id. at 727. 
 58 Adding to the difficulties with the majority’s reasoning, the opinion discusses at great length: how 
Washington law serves the state’s interest in preserving human life; the risk that suicides will be at-
tempted by those with mental disorders; the troublesome impact on the ethics of the medical profes-
sion if physician-assisted suicide were lawful; the state’s interest in protecting vulnerable groups from 
abuse, neglect, or mistakes; and the risk that lawful assisted suicide will lead to voluntary euthanasia, 
with a paragraph about how the Dutch experience raises similar concerns.  Id. at 728–35.  In this 
way, the majority opinion reads more like a Lochner-era decision that scrutinizes but upholds socio-
economic legislation.  See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908) (upholding state law 
restrictions on women’s ability to work while also acknowledging that this was a “disadvantage”). 
 59 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–68 (2000). 
 60 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4–5, 17–18, 30–35 (1973). 
 61 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 62 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 763–64 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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quires a balancing of clashing principles.63  Third, legislation must be re-
spected within a zone of reasonableness.64 
Justice Souter suggested that this approach avoids the pitfalls of Lochner, 
which he characterized as going “astray by speaking without nuance of in-
dividual interests in property or autonomy to contract for labor.”65  Rather, 
Souter called for careful judicial scrutiny “of the precise purpose being pur-
sued and the collateral consequences of the means chosen.”66  However, 
Justice Stone and his colleagues correctly understood that the problem 
Carolene Products sought to solve was not a lack of judicial nuance.  Indeed, 
Lochner-era Justices did carefully review statutes to examine their “precise 
purposes” and the “collateral consequences.”  In Lochner itself, a major flaw 
in the challenged statute identified by the majority was that the claimed 
purpose of health and safety was pretextual, while the actual legislative 
purpose was a raw wealth transfer from employers to employees.67  In a 
number of other cases, the Court upheld regulations that a majority of the 
Justices found to be acceptable limits on economic liberty in light of the 
precise purposes and the means chosen.68 
The Harlan-Souter approach seems to resemble the concept of 
“proportionality,” borrowed from German/French jurisprudence by the 
European Union, as the basis for judicial review of all legislative and 
administrative action.  This doctrine subjects all legislation to judicial review 
of the fit between stated goals and the means chosen; the leading cases hold 
that European judges review legislation to determine “whether the means 
[the law] employs to achieve the aim correspond to the importance of the 
aim and whether they are necessary for its achievement.”69  For all 
legislation, judges perform “a balancing exercise between the objectives 
pursued by the measure in issue and its adverse effects on individual 
freedom.”70  At the same time, courts apply a deferential standard of review 
for much economic and social legislation, invalidating these statutes only if 
the measure is “manifestly inappropriate.”71  The European context is quite 
different from this side of the Atlantic.  European legislation is passed by a 
European parliament with far less democratic legitimacy than our 
	
 63 Id. at 764–65. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 772. 
 66 Id.  
 67 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 61 (1905). 
 68 See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1917) (upholding labor limit on hours similar 
to the act invalidated in Lochner). 
 69 TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 139 (2d ed. 2006). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 142–43. 
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institutions,72 and European judges have no traditional ideological 
jurisprudence characterizing the American judiciary for over a century.73  
Nor is there any comparable history where judges systematically invalidated 
social policies with an unmistakable democratic mandate. 
D.  Common Law Reasoning 
David Strauss, among others, has argued that Supreme Court 
interpretations of broad constitutional text are akin to common law reasoning.74  
Melvin Eisenberg explains that common law reasoning involves the articulation 
of “social propositions”—based on morality, experience, or views of the way the 
world works—that justify judge-made doctrinal rules.75  According to 
Eisenberg, precedents are followed when judges find the case sub judice involves 
similar social propositions, and are consistently distinguished when judges find 
the case involves either different or additional social propositions.76 
Employing this perspective, Carolene Products can be read as concluding 
that the right of a dairy to sell filled milk is distinguishable from rights ex-
plicitly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.  Moreover, the dairy’s freedom 
from discrimination vis-à-vis other milk products is distinguishable from dif-
ferential treatment of African Americans.  Justice Stone explained why: the 
political process cannot ordinarily be trusted to prevent undue infringement 
on those rights explicitly protected by the Bill of Rights.77  Nor can it be re-
	
 72 The principal legitimacy of the European Union lies in the ability of each national parliament, 
through its ministers, to control the EU Executive.  Adam Cygan, The Role of National Parliaments in 
the EU’s New Constitutional Order, in 1 EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
RETHINKING THE NEW LEGAL ORDER 154 (Takis Tridimas & Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004).  Other 
than treaty amendments adopted by each parliament or national referenda, there is no ordinary 
legislation enacted by European institutions that rival the repeated adoption by American state leg-
islatures and the Congress of social legislation at risk in the Lochner era.  See id. at 154–56. 
 73 See, e.g., Michael Malecki, Judicial Behavior Behind Mask and Shield: Modeling the European Court of Justice 
8 (paper presented to Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1450856 (explaining 
that ideological divisions among U.S. Supreme Court Justices are more apparent given public dis-
sents, while capturing influences on European courts is more complicated). 
 74 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975) (using a theory of constitutional common law to analyze the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1974 Term); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 877, 903 (1996) (“Once constitutional interpretation is seen as a process akin to the 
common law, instead of as a matter of fidelity to an authoritative direction, the existing, settled 
practice becomes much less problematic.”).  For an analysis of differences between constitutional 
and common law reasoning, see Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 942 (2005).   
 75 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 75 (1988). 
 76 Id. (“Whether a precedent can consistently be distinguished turns chiefly on whether applicable 
social propositions justify different treatment of the two cases, given the social propositions that 
support the rule of the precedent.”). 
77  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“There may be narrower 
	
May 2018]    POLITICAL PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, & SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 999 
	
lied upon to prevent unfair treatment of African Americans.  However, the 
political process works well enough to protect against undue infringements 
of the rights and fair treatment for sellers of filled milk.  Implicitly, the 
Court signals an experiential claim that active judicial scrutiny of all in-
fringements on liberty and all differential treatment of those affected by law 
improperly frustrates the democratic process’s design for a good society. 
Footnote Four is highly significant, in this regard, because it implicitly 
rejects a number of other plausible rationales for distinguishing between Af-
rican Americans and filled milk sellers in determining the scope of due pro-
cess and equal protection scrutiny.  There are myriad ways to explain why 
the experience and treatment of Americans of African descent might justify 
their special treatment in the courts.  Their freedom was a major purpose 
of the bloodiest war in our nation’s history; the Fourteenth Amendment 
can be seen as supplementing the Thirteenth Amendment in specifically 
barring government from discriminating against former slaves; that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was in direct response to the Black Codes adopted 
by post-Reconstruction southern states.  Moreover, the Court’s disdain for 
active judicial scrutiny of social and economic legislation, based on the dis-
astrous record of its Lochner-era predecessors, did not raise the same prob-
lems as active scrutiny of race-based government discrimination.  Carolene 
Products, however, alluded to none of these, firmly anchoring its jurispru-
dence in the political process approach.  This is not to suggest that any of 
these factors, or additional concerns beyond the scope of this Article, might 
justify active scrutiny of laws designed to harm racial minorities.  Rather, 
we see Carolene Products as the more satisfactory solution to the quandary 
posed by Slaughter-House Cases about what groups, other than descendants of 
slaves, warrant such scrutiny.78 
Nor did Justice Stone foreshadow claims for racial equality by distin-
	
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to 
be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments.”). 
 78 Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action 
and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 695 (1991) (parsing the precise 
language of Footnote Four to suggest that the reference to “discrete and insular minorities” may 
refer to groups other than blacks and religious and national-origin minorities).  There is much to 
this claim.  Farber and Frickey correctly observe that Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 
494–95 (1954), focused on the stigmatic effects of racial classifications on minority children, not 
the shortcomings in the political process.  Farber & Frickey, supra, at 692.  Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1, 10 (1967), reasoned in part that the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
eliminate all “state sources of invidious racial discrimination,” it was not to bar racial discrimina-
tion that is the result of a political process where racial minorities cannot freely wheel and deal 
with others.  Farber & Frickey, supra, at 692.  Farber and Frickey conclude that limiting Brown and 
its progeny to process theory “divests [these cases] of much of their normative power while simul-
taneously rendering them vulnerable to attack as rooted in weak political science.”  Id. at 686–87. 
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guishing the claims of the Carolene Products Company for equal treatment 
in milk policy from the claims of Oliver Brown for equal treatment in educa-
tional policy because Carolene Products could sell other kinds of milk, while 
Oliver Brown’s daughter could not change her race.  The argument for im-
mutability as a relevant criterion for determining the types of groups to be 
preferred for active judicial protection under the Equal Protection Clause 
came later.  It was first provided for gender discrimination as a supplement 
to an explicit political process-based justification for heightened scrutiny by 
the plurality in Frontiero v. Richardson.79  Mutability does provide a coherent 
basis to distinguish race and gender from milk selling or other categories 
where the Court subsequently rejected careful scrutiny.  However, in con-
trast with a political process analysis, the criterion of immutability as the 
principal (or exclusive) justification for active judicial review is not consistent 
with other aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence.  For example, the Court has 
applied careful scrutiny to state classifications discriminating against non-
citizens eligible to become United States citizens, although this group’s sta-
tus was plainly mutable.80  Moreover, although we share the normative ethi-
cal concern with people being classified based on a trait over which they 
have no control, we agree with Professor Ely that there is not “any reason to 
suppose that elected officials are unusually unlikely to share” that concern.81 
Although David Strauss persuasively demonstrates that the Court’s 
	
 79 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)  (“[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteris-
tic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the mem-
bers of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate ‘the basic concept of our system 
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .’”  (quoting We-
ber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))). 
 80 See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1977) (holding that state classifications based on alien-
age were inherently suspect and therefore, subject to close judicial scrutiny). 
 81 ELY, supra note 9, at 150.  For a nice deconstruction of the criterion of immutability and why it 
collapses into the inquiry about prejudice, see Ortiz, infra note 123, at 732.  Although a majority 
of Justices suggested that sexual orientation is immutable in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 
2584, 2596 (2015), the district court had previously justified heightened scrutiny of a same-sex 
marriage ban in part based on an inquiry focused not on “whether a characteristic is strictly un-
changeable, but whether the characteristic is a core trait or condition that one cannot or should 
not be required to abandon.”  Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (S.D. Ohio 
2013).  The Supreme Court of Canada has similarly adopted a standard for heightened scrutiny 
that focuses on whether a trait is a “deeply personal characteristic that is either unchangeable or 
changeable only at unacceptable personal costs[.]”  Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, 528.  
In Egan, the Supreme Court of Canada analogized sexual orientation to religion.  Id. at 549–50.  
Given Professor Ely’s insights, we see no particular advantage in judges’ determining whether a 
personal cost is “acceptable” rather than focusing on political process issues.  See also Jessica A. 
Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 12 (2015) (“Asking whether a characteristic is immu-
table, in either the new or old sense, focuses attention on the victims of discrimination and their 
blameworthy or costly choices, rather than the systemic effects of biases that are not required for 
the workplace to function.”). 
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“common law constitutionalism” constrains unbridled judicial discretion,82 
it fails to provide a satisfying alternative to process theory as a basis for ap-
plying the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.  Professor Eisen-
berg’s model of common law reasoning requires courts to base new doc-
trines on empirical, moral, or experiential propositions that are widely 
shared in the community.83  Applied rigorously, this model would greatly 
limit desirable new precedents.  Indeed, the Stone Court’s overruling of 
Lochner would have been hard to justify under Eisenberg’s model.  At the 
time, a significant minority of Americans (and four of their colleagues on 
the bench) continued to believe that liberty of contract was morally justified 
and regulation of the market was likely to result in economic harm.  On the 
other hand, if a lower bar is set for experiential or moral bases for social 
propositions (of the sort needed to justify the privacy decisions in Griswold 
and its progeny), then common law constitutionalism leaves a great deal to 
judicial discretion.  On today’s Court, this means that most key decisions 
turn on Justice Kennedy’s personal moral philosophy.  In the future, deci-
sions will turn on the vagaries of presidential politics (most of which are not 
related to moral philosophy of the sort at issue before the Court). 
E.  “Fundamental” Rights 
Finally, we consider two related arguments that solve the counter-
majoritarian dilemma by rejecting it.  In Griswold, Justice Goldberg invoked 
the Ninth Amendment as showing “a belief of the Constitution’s authors that 
fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight 
amendments, and an intent that the list of rights included there not be 
deemed exhaustive.”84  He opined that the right of marital intimacy thus war-
ranted heightened judicial scrutiny.  Goldberg reasoned that it would be in-
conceivable that legislatures should have the freedom to adopt horrific intru-
sions into marital intimacy such as mandatory sterilization.85  Complementing 
this view is the contemporary argument for close scrutiny of rights that five 
Justices believe are “fundamental”: close scrutiny is consistent with democratic 
	
 82 Strauss, supra note 74, at 887–88 (referencing the method of judge made law, constrained by prior 
precedent).  Of course, common law doctrine itself is distinct from constitutional doctrine because 
it is far easier for the legislature to overturn a common law rule by statute than, at least at the fed-
eral level, it is to amend the Constitution. 
 83 EISENBERG, supra note 75, at 15, 29 (arguing that moral propositions and empirical/policy propo-
sitions must “fairly be said to have substantial support in the community”); id. at 17 (noting that 
the judge is a “participant-observer” who determines if norms are “widely shared”). 
 84 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 492 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 85 Id. at 486–87 (“[T]he concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental, and is 
not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights.”). 
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principles because voters can alter unwise decisions by electing Presidents who 
will appoint Justices to do so.86  (In this way, the Supreme Court is no more 
counter-majoritarian than the National Labor Relations Board.) 
This argument seems to reconceptualize the theory of separation of 
powers by suggesting that the role of the Supreme Court is to exercise 
broad and unfettered discretion to correct seriously misguided decisions by 
elected officials.  To accomplish this, it is important that the Justices are not 
immediately responsive to politics (otherwise there is no difference between 
their judgments and those of legislators).  However, this theory ultimately 
grounds itself on the Justices’ political responsiveness, through replacement 
by presidential appointment. 
This position is problematic for a number of reasons.  First, there is his-
tory: the Framers saw the benefits of a body of government that would have 
some ultimate democratic legitimacy but would not be immediately respon-
sive to every momentary political whim that captured the electorate.  This 
is precisely the role designed for the Senate.87  Second, the degree of re-
sponsiveness is quite haphazard.  Even in the 2016 election, when there 
were many explicit calls for voters to choose a candidate because of their 
ability to impact the Court, it is troublesome that cases involving conten-
tious constitutional issues, like abortion or corporate speech, would be de-
cided by the Court based on whether many voters had more antipathy to-
ward Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump.88  Americans can choose 
instability in ordinary social policy if they wish; in theory, elected officials 
could enact and repeal national health care following each election.  It is far 
more problematic to have constitutional politics feature similar instability.89  
Responsiveness is also based on the arbitrariness of the health of the Justic-
es: the notion that agricultural regulations and minimum wage laws might 
	
 86 For a discussion and critique of this idea, see John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theo-
ry and Practice in a World Where Courts are no Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 843–45 
(1991). 
 87 THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 379 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (seeing the Senate 
as a corrective for “the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the impulse of 
sudden and violent passions” because of the Senate’s smaller size and “a tenure of considerable 
duration”). 
 88 Cf. Ariane de Vogue, What 2016 Means for the Supreme Court, CNNPOLITICS (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:35 
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/09/11/politics/supreme-court-2016-election/index.html. 
 89 Indeed, such instability would not even be predictable, as individual Justices might decide to vote 
against their own views for the sake of continuity.  See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 88 Ill. 2d 129, 165–66 
(1981) (Goldenhersh, C.J., concurring) (explaining how three justices who dissented from prior 
decision upholding the death penalty under the Illinois Constitution would now concur in the va-
lidity of the statute, lest the law change simply from the retirement of one of the justices voting in 
the majority and his replacement with a justice who shared their view of the statute’s unconstitu-
tionality). 
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have been approved earlier in the Great Depression had one of the con-
servative “Four Horsemen” taken ill seems unsatisfying as a way to design a 
government.  Third, if Presidents run on mandates to appoint Justices who 
will overrule Roe v. Wade or Citizens United, then senators will also be ac-
countable to their own constituents for voting to confirm these Justices.90  
The logic of this scenario is that senators will refuse to confirm Supreme 
Court nominees whose personal philosophies the senators cannot defend on 
the election hustings.  The likely result here is that the only Justices who can 
be nominated and confirmed are compromise candidates whose beliefs on 
specific constitutional issues are acceptable to a President and at least fifty 
senators.  It is not clear how anyone benefits from this scenario.  Moreover, 
as John Hart Ely observes, there is somewhat of a paradox that senators 
would seek a political court, which relies on the unspoken premise that the 
very same Senate cannot be counted on to deliver desirable outcomes.91 
Risk aversion to being in the minority is another reason why ordinary 
Americans, as well as Supreme Court Justices, should reject an approach 
that enshrines every judgment about “fundamental rights” among five of 
the Justices into a constitutional mandate or prohibition.  This phenome-
non explains why virtually no major figure in American politics seriously 
calls for a new constitutional convention, although virtually all of them find 
aspects of our Constitution they would like to change.  As a matter of insti-
tutional politics, it explains why, despite gridlock, senators will not abolish 
the filibuster.  At the non-constitutional level, it explains in part why the 
Administrative Procedure Act remains virtually unchanged from 1946, 
even though there have been times when a President’s party controlled 
both Houses and could have plausibly marshalled the votes to weaken the 
standards for judicial review of agency decisions made by the President’s 
appointees.  It also indicates why broad “super-statutes” like the Sherman 
Act and the National Labor Relations Act (once an equilibrium settled be-
tween the pro-labor Wagner Act and the pro-business Taft-Hartley Act) 
remain unchanged despite temporary majorities who could modify them. 
We concede that it would be rational for someone whose overwhelming 
concern is LGBTQ rights, or unlimited political spending by individuals 
and corporations, or someone who is deeply skeptical of political institu-
	
 90 See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE:  HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 
99 (1989) (explaining that Senator Kennedy’s “landmark” speech announced that the Senate 
should not “content itself with examining a nominee’s personal integrity and legal qualifications” 
but that its constitutional duty required it to “take politics and ideology fully into account”). 
 91 Ely, supra note 86, at 835.  Between its powers under the Spending Clause, the Commerce Clause, 
and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is very little that a Congress could not do to 
achieve desired rights protection, needing only a deferential Supreme Court to stay out of its way.   
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tions and generally likes the center-right philosophy of Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, to favor the status quo.  But in light of the complete unpredicta-
bility of politics, it is not only rational but preferable to adopt Justice 
Stone’s Footnote Four approach, and to channel fights about wise social 
policy to the legislative and executive branches unless there is some objec-
tive structural failure (i.e. a failure distinctively more than a failure to adopt 
wise social policy). 
F.  Process Theory is Substantially Restraining 
We acknowledge that determining when the political process works suf-
ficiently to protect those who wish to exercise liberties is not a precise sci-
ence.  For that matter, nor is the Court’s determination of whether close 
scrutiny reveals a “compelling state interest” or when a Fourth Amendment 
challenge reveals a “reasonable” search.  Although the Carolene Products doc-
trine is not perfect, our argument is that it is superior to the alternatives in 
restraining judicial policymaking. 
A political process approach involves a more limited role for a judiciary 
that has often shown itself over the course of American constitutional histo-
ry to be ideologically divided.  Any formula can be molded or even distort-
ed by willful judges.  But the political process approach is likely to be more 
neutral: the judicial inquiry is procedural rather than substantive.  Moreo-
ver, the courts would use the same political science techniques and judicial 
standards to ascertain whether a group whose claims receive sympathy 
from either progressives or conservatives face prejudice that precludes their 
ability to wheel and deal in the legislative process.  Thus, the political pro-
cess approach applies to claims by political conservatives that political pro-
cesses are not adequate to protect the “rights” of state governments92 or 
property owners.93  Likewise, the same test applies to claims by political lib-
erals that political processes are not adequate to protect women, sexual mi-
	
 92 Compare United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 540, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (discussing an 
absence of “structural mechanisms” to require elected officials to achieve a principled balance in 
federal/state relations), with United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (stating that the Founders’ judgment was that politics will properly “mediate between 
state and national interests”). 
 93 See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 6 (1990) (providing a discussion of how the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause responded to concerns that the ordinary political process, especially in light of the actual 
treatment of property holders during the Revolutionary period, led to “a general suspicion of the 
people. . . . a permanent propertyless majority which would be fluid in its composition, but fixed 
in its inevitability.”); see also Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 
DUKE L.J. 1457, 1469–70 (2005) (discussing the difficulty of finding “judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards” for regulatory takings). 
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norities, or the poor (at least in certain contexts).    
Because of the attractiveness of process jurisprudence, we propose that 
the Court should use Footnote Four criteria to determine which liberties 
warrant close judicial scrutiny under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.  This focus may result in a body of doctrine that is more workable, 
consistent with core precedents, and accepted modern constitutional prin-
ciples, than exists at present. 
II.  THE COURT’S UNEVEN FIDELITY TO CAROLENE PRODUCTS 
In this Part, we sketch how Carolene Products has strongly influenced 
equal protection jurisprudence, particularly in providing the rationale for 
rejecting claims of close judicial scrutiny.  Less clearly, individual opinions 
have suggested that process jurisprudence plays an important role in the 
Justices’ approach to federalism issues.  Otherwise, Carolene Products’s influ-
ence is opaque, leading one commentator to observe that Footnote Four’s 
focus on powerlessness “has mostly fizzled in the case law.”94  Although 
other commentators have suggested that the Court’s affirmative action rul-
ings constitute a rejection of Carolene Products, we suggest a more nuanced 
answer.95  Moreover, several important decisions regarding judicial limits 
on the scope of Congressional power to enforce the Civil War Amendments 
are not fully reconcilable with Justice Stone’s insights.  Finally, we lament 
the failure of the Court’s due process jurisprudence to discuss process-based 
jurisprudence in any meaningful way. 
A.  Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny and Process Jurisprudence 
In the area of equal protection, the insights of process jurisprudence 
were most forcefully articulated by the Supreme Court in Vance v. Bradley: 
The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even im-
	
 94 Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (2011).  Even with regard to equal protection principles that seem to 
apply Carolene Products, the Court does not expressly cite the case.  Michael Klarman, An Interpretive 
History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 220 (1991). 
 95 See Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance, supra note 12, at 753. 
Professor Klarman also suggests that the Court’s commercial speech doctrine is inconsistent 
with process-based jurisprudence.  Id. at 756–57.  In our more limited view, the centrality of free 
speech and exchange of ideas signals a justification for heightened scrutiny for any kind of expres-
sion, and the scope of judicial protection for such expression is beyond the scope of this Article.  
We emphasize that Footnote Four contemplated three discrete exceptions to deference.  In re-
verse order, these are when prejudice or antipathy precludes reliance on the political process by a 
minority, when laws directly impede the political process, or when the Court is asked to interpret 
the “specific” rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 
1006 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:5 
	
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judi-
cial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may 
think a political branch has acted.  Thus, we will not overturn such a stat-
ute unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unre-
lated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we 
can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.96 
In many subsequent cases where the Court has rejected close judicial 
scrutiny, it has explicitly reasoned that the claimant had failed to demon-
strate the shortcomings in the political process that would justify closer ju-
dicial review.  A prime example is San Antonio v. Rodriguez, where the majori-
ty rejected a claim for strict judicial scrutiny of vastly unequal financing of 
Texas public schools.97  The Court explicitly limited close judicial scrutiny 
of equal protection challenges to three categories that were necessary to jus-
tify “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”: a 
group must be “saddled” by “disabilities,” have been subject to “a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment,” or “relegated to [ ] a position of political 
powerlessness.”98   
The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence in other cases has likewise 
extended close scrutiny to challenged discrimination because of announced 
shortcomings in the political process.  Thus, the Court has closely reviewed 
state laws discriminating against non-citizens on whom federal law has con-
ferred permanent resident status99 and against children born outside of 
wedlock.100  In Plyler v. Doe, the Court distinguished Rodriguez’s rejection of 
close scrutiny regarding an asserted fundamental right to education, in 
striking down a statute barring undocumented alien children from public 
schools.101  Most specifically, Justice Blackmun, concurring, explained that 
children who are denied an education will be placed “at a permanent  polit-
ical disadvantage.”102  Such children and their parents had no votes, and 
were thus “relegated to [ ] a position of political powerlessness” that justi-
fied special judicial protection.103 
The Court’s justification for extending closer judicial scrutiny to 
discrimination against women is instructive in developing the importance of 
	
 96 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979) (emphasis added). 
 97 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973). 
 98 Id. at 28. 
 99 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (noting that classifications based on al-
ienage are “inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny”). 
 100 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (citing Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)) 
(detailing how classifications based on illegitimacy must be “substantially related to permissible 
state interests” to be considered valid under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 101 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. at 234. 
 103 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
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the Court’s perceptions of the political process as it affects groups adversely 
affected by social welfare legislation.  In United States v. Virginia (the “VMI case”), 
a near unanimous majority reaffirmed precedents departing from rational basis 
scrutiny to demand an “exceedingly persuasive justification” to justify gender-
based government action.104  The first decision to explicitly acknowledge 
heightened scrutiny for gender-based discrimination was Frontiero v. Richardson, 
where Justice William Brennan, writing for four Justices, acknowledged that a 
prior decision striking down a state probate law favoring men, purportedly on 
rational basis grounds, was really a “clearly justified” departure from rational 
basis scrutiny.105  Frontiero cited a history of “gross, stereotyped distinctions 
between the sexes and, indeed, throughout much of the 19th century the 
position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of 
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes.”106  Significantly, Justice Brennan 
observed that, although “the position of women in America has improved 
markedly in recent decades,” women still faced “pervasive, although at times 
more subtle, discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market 
and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political arena.”107 
Dissenting alone in the VMI case, Justice Antonin Scalia pointedly ques-
tioned why gender discrimination warranted such judicial attention: 
It is hard to consider women a “discrete and insular minorit[y]” unable to 
employ the “political processes ordinarily to be relied upon,” when they 
constitute a majority of the electorate.  And the suggestion that they are in-
capable of exerting that political power smacks of the same paternalism 
that the Court so roundly condemns.108 
Justice Scalia went on to cite passage of federal statutes such as the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972, the Women’s Business Ownership Act of 
1988, and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994109 to demonstrate the 
political prowess that women possess.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s ma-
jority opinion indirectly responded, finding close scrutiny to be still justified, 
concluding that “[t]oday’s skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights 
or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history.  As a plurality 
of this Court acknowledged a generation ago, ‘our Nation has had a long 
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.’”110 
	
 104 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (citing J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 136–37 (1994) and 
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
 105 411 U.S. at 684. 
 106 Id. at 685. 
 107 Id. at 685–86 (emphasis added). 
 108 518 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 109 Id. at 575–76 (citations omitted). 
 110 518 U.S. at 531 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684).  In a similar vein, consider the specific liber-
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The logic of Carolene Products and Frontiero suggest that the time may 
come when Justice Scalia’s claim is accepted by a majority of the Justices.  
Inherent in the doctrine of Footnote Four must be the notion that, if the 
Court can justify careful scrutiny of legislation on the grounds that it disad-
vantages a group that has been found to be victimized by prejudice and an-
tipathy, it can also determine that challenged legislation is no longer the 
product of such victimization and prejudice.111 
The Court’s current equal protection doctrine mandates close scrutiny 
for legislative policies that seek to remedy racial injustice by conscious steps 
that favor racial minorities.112  Dissenting Justices and commentators have 
emphatically complained that these decisions should be largely left to the 
political process, and the Court’s role represents a perversion of equality ju-
risprudence.113  Because our argument is solely that process jurisprudence 
should guide the threshold question whether to defer or more closely scru-
tinize legislative and executive choices, and not to the particular non-
deferential doctrine the Justices adopt, we do not believe that affirmative 
action doctrine necessarily represents a rejection of Carolene Products.   
Affirmative action is, like many difficult questions of constitutional law, a 
	
ties entrenched in the Bill of Rights: free expression, religious liberty, self-protection through 
arms, preserving the home from military quartering or searches, preserving property rights, and 
myriad rights of targets of law enforcement.  While these liberties vary in importance, controver-
sy, and independent moral justification, almost all are mutable, but share one thing in common: 
the apparent perception of those in the ratification process that demanded a Bill of Rights that 
these liberties were unlikely to be protected by the political process.  Unlike the case of a “discrete 
and insular minorit[y]” entitled to “extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political pro-
cess” based on a judicial determination of prejudicial antipathy, see Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 
93, 113–14 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), those protected by specific provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights retain their protection even if judges no longer find that special protec-
tion is warranted.  Many today would assert that gun owners are fully capable of protecting their 
own interests in the political process, but the current Court concluded that the purpose of the 
Second Amendment reflected the concern of those involved in demanding a Bill of Rights that 
these interests would not be adequately protected in Congress.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 595–600 (2008) (determining that the Founders codified the Second Amendment in 
order to preserve a citizen militia, with self-defense being a “central component” of that right). 
 111 See David Schraub, Unsuspecting, 96 B.U. L. REV. 361, 419–22 (2016) (discussing whether the Su-
preme Court can remove a group from the “suspect class” category when the Court demonstrates 
that “democratic bodies can be trusted to legislate on” that class). 
 112 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (ap-
plying strict scrutiny to legislative plans wherein students were allocated slots to particular schools 
based on racial classifications with the intended purpose of ensuring racial diversity). 
 113 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 243 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing as “untenable” the analogy between “a policy that is designed to perpetuate a caste 
system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination”); John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of 
Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 735–36 (1974) (noting that reasons for em-
ploying stringent review are lacking when “the group that controls the decision making process 
classifies so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself”). 
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contentious issue of public policy.  Language in a number of opinions sug-
gests a reasoning that is consistent with Carolene Products.  Justices have ap-
proved heightened scrutiny to ensure that statutes purporting to benefit racial 
minorities do not harm them.  Justices have also argued that, although af-
firmative action schemes may benefit specific minority race individuals, they 
end up harming racial minorities by generating hostility toward them by oth-
er racial groups and perpetuating stereotypes that harm efforts to end racial 
animosity.114  To be clear, we are not claiming that this reasoning accurately 
describes the subjective thinking of every Justice who has voted to invalidate 
affirmative action policies,115 nor that we necessarily agree with this reason-
ing.  Our modest goal is simply to refute the claim that affirmative action ju-
risprudence necessarily signals the death of process jurisprudence. 
B.  Federalism and Process Jurisprudence 
Likewise, in the area of federalism, the current division on the Supreme 
Court can be explained, at least to a significant degree, by the Justices’ dif-
fering assessments of the claim that close judicial scrutiny of federalism 
claims is unnecessary because the political process adequately protects 
states’ rights.  For example, in South Carolina v. Baker,116 the Court rejected a 
Tenth Amendment challenge to federal tax on state bonds.  Citing Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held “that States must 
	
 114 See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality) 
(citation omitted) (noting the “danger of stigmatic harm” when race-based classifications are used 
outside of remedial settings); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) 
(Powell, J., plurality) (arguing that preferential treatment for a particular class may not be used to 
“enhance the societal standing” of that class, and that such treatment may reinforce stereotypes).  
Chief Justice Roberts articulated clearly the instrumental view that affirmative action harms the 
goal of racial equality: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminat-
ing on the basis of race.”  Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748. 
 115 Professors Farber and Frickey, supra note 78, at 719–20, criticize Carolene Products as justifying the 
use of the Equal Protection Clause as a sword against, rather than a shield protecting, racial mi-
norities with regard to affirmative action.  As noted above, many adhere to the view that the 
Fourteenth Amendment uniquely protects racial minorities.  Under this view, judicial protection 
of racial minorities against discrimination is akin to judicial protection of wealthy media corpora-
tions, gun owners, or property owners whose rights are expressly protected by the original under-
standing of the relevant constitutional amendments: Carolene Products simply doesn’t speak to 
heightened scrutiny in these areas where the Constitution has explicitly spoken.  We are not in-
clined to jettison the powerful insights in Footnote Four over a concern about affirmative action 
in pursuit of racial justice.  The fact is that judges who favor the need for race-conscious societal 
remedies are unlikely to find that individuals disadvantaged by affirmative action are really de-
prived of an opportunity to wheel and deal to redress their grievances.  See id. at 689 
(“[A]ffirmative action has survived (at least at the federal level) as the result of normal pluralist 
politics, in which the opponents have not lacked for a voice.”). 
 116 485 U.S. 505, 511–12 (1988). 
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find their protection from congressional regulation through the national po-
litical process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state 
activity.”117  The Court explicitly cited Footnote Four in concluding: “[I]t 
suffices to observe that South Carolina has not even alleged that it was de-
prived of any right to participate in the national political process or that it 
was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless.”118 
Reaching a different conclusion but asking the same questions, Justice 
Kennedy used process analysis to justify a more searching review and the need 
for justiciable limits on Congress’s constitutional power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  He explicitly rejected the argument that constitutional federalism 
values could be protected by the political process.  Kennedy noted an “ab-
sence of structural mechanisms” to require federal officials to preserve the fed-
eral/state balance and “the momentary political convenience often attendant 
upon their failure to do so.”119  In contrast, Justice Souter, in dissent, explicitly 
argued that the political process is sufficient to preclude active judicial scrutiny 
of Congress’s determination that its regulatory legislation had a sufficient im-
pact on interstate commerce to warrant national legislation.120 
C.  Substantive Due Process and (the lack of) Process Jurisprudence 
Modern jurisprudence has not satisfactorily developed workable and 
analytically sound criteria for determining when judges should closely scru-
tinize claims that are not grounded in those liberties explicitly guaranteed 
in the Bill of Rights.121  For over a century, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
struggled with how closely to scrutinize legislation claimed to infringe non-
specific liberties that are contended to be protected from deprivation without 
	
 117 Id. at 512–13 (citing 469 U.S. 528, 537–54 (1985)). 
 118 Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938)). 
 119 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 120 See id. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a judicial policy of relative deference to Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause determination reflects “respect for the institutional competence of the 
Congress on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation of the le-
gitimacy that comes from Congress’s political accountability in dealing with matters open to a 
wide range of possible choices”).   
 121 See, e.g., United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the 
“picking and choosing among various rights to be accorded ‘substantive due process’ protection” 
as being the product of “policymaking rather than neutral legal analysis”); ELY, supra note 9, at 
14–20 (indicting the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence as incoherent and instead urg-
ing that the judiciary intercede only when there is a blockage in the political process); JoEllen 
Lind, Liberty, Community, and the Ninth Amendment, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1259, 1272 (1993) (“[T]he rea-
sons why these rights ought to be deemed fundamental were never really articulated with refer-
ence to any positive conception of the person or of society, nor were they meaningfully related to 
the rights claims presented by groups without significant political power.”). 
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due process of law,122 in contrast with legislation infringing specific liberties 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 123  As with equal protection, there is wide-
spread agreement that the close scrutiny of most social and economic legis-
lation under the Due Process Clause that characterized the “Lochner era” 
was a judicial mistake.124  The challenge has been to identify those “ex-
traordinary” circumstances where liberty-infringement warrants heightened 
judicial protection.125   
	
 122 See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he Court has always 
been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsi-
ble decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.”); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 481–83 (1965) (surveying due process jurisprudence in the course of finding a 
constitutional right to privacy); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (asking whether a 
maximum hour law for bakers represents “a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the po-
lice power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the 
right of the individual to his personal liberty”).  There is a large and lively cottage industry of legal 
scholarship that seeks to answer this very question.  See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, 
REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 
(2011) (seeking to reestablish Lochner’s legitimacy as a proper understanding of the Constitution’s 
due process protections); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending 
constitutional interpretation that evolves in accordance with shifting societal understandings of 
their constitutional entitlements); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 
(1987) (arguing that Lochner was not wrong because it represented an aggressive form of judicial 
review, but because it misapplied the constitutional value of neutrality). 
 123 In Carolene Products itself, the claim was that the ban on sale of filled milk violated the general pro-
hibition on Due Process in the Fifth Amendment, so the Court’s reference in Footnote Four to a 
“specific prohibition,” 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4, should be understood to exclude additional sub-
stantive due process claims. 
Professor Daniel Ortiz, in Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. 
L. REV. 721, 727 (1991), suggests that Footnote Four’s exception to judicial deference for acts vio-
lating specified constitutional rights “embodies a type of theory strikingly different from those em-
bodied in” concerns about legislation targeting the political process or legislation reflecting preju-
dice that animates the second and third paragraphs of the Footnote.  Another view is that many, if 
not all, of the first eight amendments reflect explicit understandings of rights that, because of preju-
dice, are unlikely to be protected by Madisonian factional bargaining in the political process.   
 124 See College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999) 
(describing Lochner as a “discredited substantive-due-process case”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481–82 
(1965) (declining to rely on Lochner because the Supreme Court does “not sit as a super-legislature 
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business af-
fairs, or social conditions”); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that 
prevailed in Lochner . . . —that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded.”); see also, e.g., 
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 270 (2012) (placing Lochner along with Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson, in 
“the lowest circle of constitutional Hell”); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 
391 (2011) (noting that Lochner is the case most frequently identified as being part of the constitu-
tional “anticanon”); David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373–74 
(2003) (“You have to reject Lochner if you want to be in the mainstream of American constitutional 
law today.”).  But see BERNSTEIN, supra note 122 (arguing in favor of Lochner’s legitimacy as a prop-
er understanding of the Constitution’s due process protections). 
 125 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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It is somewhat curious, then, that the Court has never seriously consid-
ered applying its landmark Footnote Four analysis to solve this problem.126  
Such an approach would extend close judicial scrutiny beyond rights ex-
plicitly listed in the Constitution to those rights presented by individuals 
saddled with difficulties that tend “seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”127  
These political disabilities arise out of the claimed right, rather than the 
claimant’s status.  Claimants seeking close review of “substantive due pro-
cess” claims should succeed upon demonstrating that the presumption that 
“improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic pro-
cess”128 does not apply to their situation.129  We explain this test below. 
III.  REINVIGORATING CAROLENE PRODUCTS IN MODERN DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
We propose to reinvigorate Carolene Products as the preferable doctrine to 
deal with the American counter-majoritarian dilemma.  First, we suggest, per 
Justice Jackson, that judges should analyze challenges to laws under the Equal 
Protection Clause before subjecting these laws to substantive due process 
review.  Second, per Justice Marshall, we articulate a test for claimants to 
demonstrate the necessary failure of political processes in order to obtain close 
scrutiny, focusing on the claimants’ inability to participate in the normal 
factional bargaining inherent in legislative deliberations.  Third, we return to 
Justice Stone’s insights in Carolene Products, which was in part a substantive due 
process case, to offer a preferred criterion to justify close scrutiny for rights not 
expressly protected in the Constitution.  We suggest that judges should focus 
on whether, based on the claimants’ exercise of their putative rights, they are 
unable to meaningfully use the political process to redress grievances.   
	
 126 One possible suggestion is offered by David Strauss, supra note 124, at 374, who observes that 
“there is no consensus on why [Lochner] is wrong.”  If Carolene Products was Justice Stone’s solution 
to Lochner, and there is no consensus that the problem with Lochner was close judicial scrutiny of 
labor legislation when employers had ample means to protect themselves in the political process, 
then there can be no real consensus on the appropriate approach for substantive due process. 
 127 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
 128 Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).   
 129 As we discuss below, a number of significant due process issues can be resolved, in our view, on 
equal protection grounds.  Beyond the specific scope of the Article but related to our thesis is our 
view that close scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause should also follow the three-category 
test articulated in Rodriguez.  See supra note 97. 
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A.  Equal Protection First 
Footnote Four may have led equal protection doctrine from the “last re-
sort” of constitutional arguments130 to a “mainstay of constitutional law.”131  
However, the Court should go further and embrace Justice Jackson’s Rail-
way Express insight that judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 
(or its implied Fifth Amendment equivalent) is preferred to substantive due 
process review.132  The majority opinion by Justice William Douglas for 
himself and six colleagues was unexceptional: the Court upheld, against a 
due process and equal protection challenge, a municipal regulation barring 
advertising on business delivery vehicles.133  The Court deferentially af-
firmed the judgment of New York City officials that truck advertising was a 
traffic hazard.134  The claimant argued that gaudy Times Square adver-
tisements posed an equal traffic hazard, as did self-advertisements on busi-
ness-owned trucks exempted from the regulation.135  The majority rejected 
these arguments, simply concluding that these concerns did “not contain 
the kind of discrimination against which the Equal Protection Clause af-
fords protection.”136  One reason that this decision appears in the leading 
constitutional law casebooks, though, is Justice Jackson’s concurrence.  A 
scarred veteran of the Lochner-era judicial attack on social legislation (he 
served as Solicitor General and Attorney General in the Roosevelt Admin-
istration137), Jackson observed that active judicial review under the Due 
Process Clause “frequently disables all government.”138  He argued that: 
Invocation of the equal protection clause, on the other hand, does not 
disable any governmental body from dealing with the subject at hand.  It 
merely means that the prohibition or regulation must have a broader im-
pact.  I regard it as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal 
Government must exercise their powers so as not to discriminate between 
their inhabitants except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related 
to the object of regulation.  This equality is not merely abstract justice.  
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that 
	
 130 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 131 Farber & Frickey, supra note 78, at 690. 
 132 See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1949) (Jackson, J. concurring) (argu-
ing that the Equal Protection Clause should be the preferred method of challenging municipal 
laws or ordinances because successful equal protection challenges, unlike substantive due process 
claims, do not prohibit a municipality from regulating certain subject matter). 
 133  Id. at 107–11. 
 134  Id. at 111. 
 135  Id. at 110. 
 136 Id. 
 137 For a personal review, see ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A 
STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941). 
 138  Ry. Express Agency, 336 U.S. at 112 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable govern-
ment than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a mi-
nority must be imposed generally.  Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action 
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will 
apply legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon 
them if larger numbers were affected.  Courts can take no better measure to as-
sure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.139 
The varied rationales used by the Justices in Griswold v. Connecticut140 to 
strike down a state law barring individuals from using or aiding others to 
use a contraceptive illustrate Justice Jackson’s insight.  In fact, judges and 
commentators have struggled for decades to develop a workable and ana-
lytically sound rationale for striking down the statute under the Due Process 
Clause.  The majority opinion by Justice Douglas and the concurring opin-
ion by Justice Goldberg are difficult to reconcile with Carolene Products’s view 
that close judicial scrutiny of legislation under the Due Process Clause be 
limited to laws infringing specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, laws inter-
fering with the political process, and laws targeted against discrete and insu-
lar minorities.  Justice Byron White’s concurring opinion was more in keep-
ing with both Carolene Products and Justice Jackson’s insights.  He concluded 
that a “substantial burden of justification”—i.e., heightened scrutiny—was 
appropriate because the statute’s “clear effect” was to inequitably “deny 
disadvantaged citizens of Connecticut, those without either adequate 
knowledge or resources to obtain private counseling, access to medical as-
sistance and up-to-date information in respect to proper methods of birth 
control.”141  Noted political scientist Martin Shapiro observed, in this re-
	
 139 Id. at 112–13 (emphasis added); see also Powell, supra note 6, at 1090 (describing the view that the 
use of equal protection in protecting minority interests does not, unlike substantive due process, 
result in judicial imposition of “its own substantive values and distributive preferences on the 
Constitution and on the people of the United States”). 
If Justice Jackson’s views expressed here were adopted and strictly applied, it would pre-
clude legislative experimentation that enacted reforms “one step at a time.”  Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).  But the concern articulated in Carolene 
Products’s Footnote Four, that close scrutiny may be justified when prejudice tends “seriously to 
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties,” 304 U.S. at 153 n.4, reflects the presumption that ordinarily the political process will extend 
successful reforms more broadly or will repeal experiments that did not work out.  Where a legis-
lature singles out a discrete and insular group, saddled with disabilities that preclude their effec-
tive participation in the political process under the guise of “one step at a time” reform, there is 
no basis to apply Williamson’s observation about regulation that applied to a significant trade 
group capable of presenting its own interests before the Oklahoma legislature. 
 140 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 141 Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Justice White intimated that judicial scrutiny 
was more justified than for substantive due process claims “which derive merely from shifting 
economic arrangements.” Id. (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)).  But he did not fully explain precisely why closer scrutiny was justified nor how to 
distinguish economic issues warranting deference from other claims. 
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gard, how the facts of the case were crucial: “middle-class women received 
birth control information and purchased birth control supplies, and the 
Connecticut statute was enforced only to block the operation of birth con-
trol clinics that would bring these services to the poor.”142  Indeed, the ap-
pellants in the case were the executive director of the State’s Planned 
Parenthood League and the medical director of the League’s New Haven 
clinic.143  We believe this precisely fits Justice Jackson’s sage insight that the 
surest way to protect liberty is to insist that restrictions be applied equally: 
there is a very strong likelihood that the legislature would not have sus-
tained these restrictions, had they been meaningfully applied to preclude all 
Connecticut women from obtaining contraception.  Viewed from an equal-
ity lens, there was little justification for allowing affluent suburbanites to ob-
tain birth control pills denied to poor women in New Haven. 
B.  Proving Powerlessness 
Unfortunately, Carolene Products does not precisely specify how claimants 
prove that their opportunities to use “those political processes ordinarily to 
be relied upon to protect minorities” are seriously curtailed.144  The Court 
provided a bit more guidance in Rodriguez, but not much.  The Court sug-
gested, in the disjunctive, that proof of historical subordination “or” power-
lessness might suffice, but it did not specify the details of the political power-
lessness needed by a group to justify “extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.”145  The precise standards remain under-
	
 142 Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER 
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN’T 218, 229 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983). 
 143 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480; see also Cary Franklin, Griswold and the Public Dimension of the Right to Priva-
cy, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 332, 332 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org /forum/griswold-and-
the-public-dimension-of-the-right-to-privacy (identifying Griswold as part of the Warren Court’s 
“poverty” cases because the effect of the Connecticut law was to block access to contraception by 
the poor); Melissa Murray, Overlooking Equality on the Road to Griswold, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 324, 
325–26 (2015), http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/forum/overlooking-equality-on-the-road-to-
griswold (noting how Griswold’s companion case, Trubek v. Ullman, presented a potential alternative 
framing of the privacy right that emphasized equality within a marriage as opposed to a traditional 
model of male-breadwinner/female-homemaker); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a 
Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 357 (2015), http://www. 
yalelawjournal.org/forum/contraception-as-a-sex-equality-right (contending that “[e]quality values 
anchor not only a right to access contraception free from government interference,” but also gov-
ernment’s interest in equalizing access to contraception for those for whom it is otherwise blocked). 
 144  304 U.S. at 152 n.4. 
 145 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973);  see also, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II 
& Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 
333 (2016) (explaining that the Court finally articulated a suspect class status that asked whether 
the group had political power).  Some courts have attempted to resolve this problem by compar-
ing the group at hand with women, blacks, and other social classes which have already received 
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articulated,146 and a thorough review of equal protection precedents show 
the Court’s varied use of many different standards since the 1960s.147 
We find insightful and persuasive the views expressed in the context of 
racial discrimination in voting rights by Justice Marshall, in his dissent in 
Mobile v. Bolden.148  He pointedly distinguished what he described as the val-
id claim that a state had denied minority race voters “equal access to the 
political process” from the claim of proportional representation.  Echoing 
the prior year’s judgment in Vance v. Bradley, Justice Marshall noted that the 
Court’s presumptive faith in the political process suggested that ordinarily 
even groups that lose elections can protect their own interests against im-
provident decisionmaking.149  To show a defect in the political process re-
quiring judicial intervention, Marshall reasoned, required proof by a dis-
crete political minority that “historical and social factors render it largely 
incapable of effectively utilizing alternative avenues of influencing public 
policy.”150  Later in his opinion, he suggested another important criterion: 
whether a group’s “electoral discreteness and insularity allow dominant politi-
cal factions to ignore them.”151 
	
heightened judicial scrutiny.  See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 452–53 
(Conn. 2008) (adopting this approach with respect to sexual orientation).  But overall, lower 
courts have been markedly inconsistent in their attempts to apply the Rodriguez factors to new 
claimants.  See David Schraub, Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection 
in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437, 1453–60 (2010) (comparing rulings on same-
sex marriage in various courts). 
 146 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Political Powerlessness, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2015) (de-
scribing the court’s “conflicting and atheoretical pronouncements” and scholar’s inconsistent 
views on powerlessness”); see also Schacter, supra note 94, at 1376 (“[J]ustices have had very little to 
say about what the idea of political powerlessness means and requires, and even less to say about 
the underlying idea of democracy informing the Court’s assessment of the political process.”). 
 147 See Ross & Li, supra note 145, at 329–40 (analyzing decisions confronting political powerlessness). 
 148 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 104–05 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall’s 
judgment was ultimately vindicated when Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional power 
under Section Two of the Fifteenth Amendment, effectively overturned the majority’s holding 
that a voting rights claim required proof of intent to harm minority race voters.  Voting Rights 
Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 
(2016)); see Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that this language was en-
acted “largely in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in [Bolden]”). 
 149 Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 111 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“For example, many of these persons might 
belong to a variety of other political, social, and economic groups that have some impact on offi-
cials.  In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it may be assumed that officials will not be im-
properly influenced by such factors as the race or place of residence of persons seeking govern-
mental action.  Furthermore, political factions out of office often serve as watchdogs on the 
performance of the government, bind together into coalitions having enhanced influence, and 
have the respectability necessary to affect public policy.”).   
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at 122 (emphasis added).  Justice Marshall’s concern about the political process was also re-
flected in a less politically charged opinion in a baseball antitrust case, Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 
(1972).  Marshall dissented from the majority judgment that Congress, through “positive inac-
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Justice Marshall’s expressed concern about problems associated with 
dominant factions ignoring smaller factions was, of course, one of the pre-
cise worries leading to Madison’s optimism about the prospects for the 
American Republic.  Madison conceded in Federalist No. 10 that un-
checked democracy had led to instances where measures were enacted “not 
according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by 
the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.”152  However, 
“factious combinations” are less to be dreaded in the larger society he con-
templated, because in such a nation: 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less prob-
able that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the 
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more 
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in 
unison with each other.153   
Likewise, in Federalist No. 51 Madison predicted that the “multiplicity of 
interests” present in the United States meant that “a coalition of a majority 
of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than 
those of justice and the general good.”154 
	
tion,” had decided not to overrule a 1922 judgment exempting baseball from the Sherman Act 
although every other professional sport was subject to competition law.  Rather, Marshall opined 
that Congress had not acquiesced in the judicially-created exemption:  
“Had the Court been consistent and treated all sports in the same way baseball was 
treated, Congress might have become concerned enough to take action. But . . . baseball 
was isolated and distinguished from all other sports. 
. . . [T]here are only some 600 major league baseball players. Whatever muscle they 
might have been able to muster by combining forces with other athletes has been greatly 
impaired by the manner in which is Court has isolated them.”  
  Id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  See discussion infra accompanying note 182, indicating that we 
do not read Justice Marshall’s focus on groups who can be ignored by dominant political factions 
to be limited to those who necessarily are discrete and insular. 
 152 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 153 Id. at 83. 
 154 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324–25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  We prefer the 
Madison-Marshall approach to the powerless test proposed by Professor Stephanopoulos, supra 
note 146, at 1531 (“A group is relatively powerless if its aggregate policy preferences are less likely 
to be enacted than those of similarly sized and classified groups.”) (emphasis omitted).  Stepha-
nopoulos acknowledges that pluralism typically protects minorities but that “sometimes a group is 
unable to cut deals with its counterparts, and so ends up being outvoted on item after item.” Id.  
We believe that the Carolene Products presumption should only be overcome by a conclusion that 
animus or prejudice toward the group is the cause of their inability to cut deals with counterparts.  
It might be that a group is outvoted on “item after item” because they demand to preserve one 
single public policy that currently exists and are unwilling to part with it as the price of their other 
grievances.  Or perhaps a group is constantly outvoted because they refuse to compromise in any 
way.  Finally, given that Carolene Products is a specific response to the Lochner era, we are wary of the 
breadth of Stephanopoulos’ definition: there may well be a variety of business owners, for exam-
ple, whose aggregate policy preferences (freedom from any government regulation of their busi-
ness) are less likely to be enacted than other similarly sized groups, but who still have the ability to 
cut deals and have their interests accommodated to some degree in the legislative process. 
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Professor Ely makes the same point in elaborating on Footnote Four.  
He rejected the argument that discreteness and insularity were sufficient for 
a minority group to claim heightened scrutiny.  Ely emphasized that this 
was not “what Justice Stone meant.”155  Rather, Stone intended to refer to 
the “sort of ‘pluralist’ wheeling and dealing by which the various minorities 
that make up our society typically interact to protect their interests.”156  
Closer scrutiny was required only for “those minorities for which such a 
system of ‘mutual defense pacts’ will prove recurrently unavailing.”157   
Especially given the tentative wording of Footnote Four,158 we agree 
with Professor Ely’s restatement of the political process theory underlying 
the footnote’s third paragraph.  Thus, it is the unwillingness of other factions to 
form coalitions with certain minority groups, even when overlapping “multiplicity of inter-
ests” make temporary “mutual defense pacts” mutually beneficial, that Footnote Four 
means by “prejudice.”159  We believe this restatement more accurately express-
es the theory than Professor Ely’s phrasing elsewhere in his book, when he 
focuses more narrowly on differential treatment of a group “largely for the 
sake of simply disadvantaging its members.”160  Indeed, under current doc-
trine, those who can demonstrate that a challenged statute largely reflects 
an intent to disadvantage a target group does not need to justify heightened 
scrutiny under Carolene Products.  This is because the Supreme Court has 
held that such “animus” is irrational and thus fails the presumptive deferen-
tial test for which Footnote Four is the exception.161  Our position is that a 
group ought to qualify for judicial protection from majoritarian political 
processes not only if it can show hostility, but also that its numbers or concerns 
are so minimized by elected officials that its concerns are not addressed. 
The ongoing debate about national health insurance provides a useful 
	
 155  ELY, supra note 9, at 151. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Justice Stone’s law clerk, who went on to a career as a prominent academic, observed that “[t]he 
modest hope was that the Footnote would catalyze thoroughgoing analysis and discussion by bar, 
bench, and academe, and that a complete and well-rounded doctrine would eventuate.”  Louis 
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1099 (1982). 
 159 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324–25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); ELY, supra 
note 9, at 151; Strauss, Carolene Products, supra note 16, at 1257 (explaining that “insular” 
groups are those with whom other groups “will not form coalitions . . . and, critically, not because 
of a lack of common interests, but because of ‘prejudice.”). 
 160 ELY, supra note 9, at 153. 
 161 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (holding that state constitutional amend-
ment adopted by referendum that barred local governments from outlawing discrimination on 
sexual orientation failed rational basis scrutiny because analysis of breadth of amendment and 
reasons offered for it “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”); 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding that the desire “to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest” (emphasis omitted)). 
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illustration of how the political process ordinarily works to allow groups and 
their representatives to prioritize and bargain with competing groups to 
vindicate their most important concerns.  Proponents of the Affordable 
Care Act maintained that access to health care is a “right” that the gov-
ernment must provide to all Americans.162  In contrast, many opponents 
focused on how the Act’s mandate that individuals purchase health insur-
ance violated the “right” of Americans to decide for themselves what kind 
of insurance to purchase.163  Nine Justices should not determine which one 
of these competing “rights” claims is valid, because there is no evidence 
that the political process cannot resolve it.  If factions intensely opposed to 
“Obamacare” had been willing to compromise on other issues of key im-
portance to key factions within the winning coalition, these groups might 
well have prevailed.164 
In Footnote Four, Justice Stone pointedly noted that prejudice against 
minorities was a “special condition,” an exception from normal circum-
stances where “political processes [are] ordinarily to be relied upon to pro-
tect minorities.”165  The contrast between circumstances where political 
processes fail to protect minorities and political processes can work to pro-
tect minorities may be illustrated by contrasting the political power of Afri-
can Americans in Mobile, Alabama in the 1970s with that of gay and lesbi-
an voters in San Francisco, California during the 1980s.   
	
 162 See, e.g., Edward M. Kennedy, Health Care as a Basic Human Right: Moving from Lip Service to Reality, 22 
HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 165, 168 (2009) (“The time has come to recognize quality, affordable 
health care as a basic right for all Americans, not just an expensive privilege for the few.”); Ed-
ward M. Kennedy, Speech before the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 25, 2008) (tran-
script available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/25/
kennedy.dnc.transcript/index.html?eref=rss_latest) (“[T]his is the cause of my life—new hope 
that we will break the old gridlock and guarantee that every American—north, south, east, west, 
young, old—will have decent, quality health care as a fundamental right and not a privilege.”). 
 163 See, e.g., Josh Blackman, The Libertarian Challenge to Obamacare: How the Constitutional Challenge to 
Obamacare Pitted Liberty Against Power, REASON (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/24/the-libertarian-challenge-to-obamacare (contending 
that the health care mandate “offends libertarian principles of individual autonomy and free 
choice”); Robert E. Moffit, Obamacare and the Individual Mandate: Violating Personal Liberty and Federal-
ism, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/ 
01/obamacare-and-the-individual-mandate-violating-personal-liberty-and-federalism (“At its 
core, this dispute is not simply about regulating the business of insurance—or crafting a scheme of 
universal health insurance coverage.  It’s about an individual’s right to choose to participate.” 
(quoting Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010)).  
 164 Because of the highly partisan nature of modern politics, these compromises were not even pro-
posed.  But one can easily imagine that Obamacare would not have barely passed with the nar-
rowest majorities without the strong support of organized labor.  Republicans might have been 
able to trade support for labor law reform for the AFL-CIO’s opposition to Obamacare; likewise 
with many other specific proposals of interest to factions within the winning Democratic coalition. 
 165 United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). 
1020 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:5 
	
At the time, Mobile was governed by three commissioners elected city-
wide.  No African American had ever been elected, even though African 
Americans comprised approximately one-third of the population.166  Nor 
was it likely that a white candidate would be elected with a bi-racial coali-
tion of support.  In a Voting Rights Act proceeding, the trial judge found 
that where there is a white candidate “identified with a favorable vote in 
the black wards, or identified with sponsoring particularized black 
needs. . . . a white backlash occurs which usually results in the defeat 
of . . . the white candidate identified with the blacks.”167  As a result, during 
the 1970s, any efforts to displace the white politicians governing Mobile 
with a bi-racial coalition would have been doomed to failure.  Court-
ordered reform replaced the commissioners with a mayor and a council 
elected by district and required that budgets receive votes of five of seven 
councilmembers in order to assure a multi-racial coalition.  Only then, 
white business leaders were able to join with representatives of the African 
American community to develop new initiatives for the city, based in part 
on a willingness of the white leaders to address historic discrimination in 
municipal services in black neighborhoods in return for black support for 
downtown redevelopment and other civic initiatives.168  The ability of these 
civic leaders to address minority concerns without backlash is critical for 
political processes to work to protect minorities,169 as Justice Stone envi-
	
 166 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S 55, 122–23 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[N]o Negro had 
ever been elected to the Mobile City Commission, despite the fact that Negroes constitute about 
one-third of the electorate, and that the persistence of severe racial bloc voting made it highly un-
likely that any Negro could be elected at large in the foreseeable future.”).  
 167 Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 388 (S.D. Ala. 1976).  The district court identified a 
single instance of a white politician being elected to the commission with substantial black support 
in the case of Joseph N. Langan, who served from 1953 to 1969.  Id.  However, once the Voting 
Rights Act expanded the number of enfranchised black voters, Langan’s association with the 
black population became an insurmountable political liability, and he was defeated for reelection 
in 1969 and again in 1972.  Id.  The court contrasted the at-large scheme in the City with a small-
er, single-member state senate race where the population was evenly divided on racial lines; alt-
hough a white candidate narrowly prevailed over a black opponent, both candidates appealed for 
votes of both races.  Id.; see also Patsy Busby Dow, Joseph N. Langan: Mobile’s Racial Diplomat 
47–48 (June 1993) (Master’s Thesis in History, University of South Alabama) (on file with author) 
(recounting overt campaigning against Langan based on his support among black voters); id. at 
54–56 (describing Langan’s 1969 defeat facing opposition from white supremacists and a boycott 
by many black voters impatient with slow racial progress). 
 168 Interview with Michael C. Dow, Mayor of Mobile (1989–2005) (Sept. 8, 2016).  The district court 
in the Voting Rights Act case had found a substantial lack of responsiveness of the all-white city 
commission to the needs and concerns of the one-third of their constituents who were black.  Bol-
den, 423 F. Supp. at 389–92 (“The at-large elected city commissioners have not been responsive to 
the minorities’ needs.  The 1970 population of the city is 64.5% white and 35.4% black.”). 
 169 See Mobile, 446 U.S. at 123 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that this backlash can be avoided 
by preserving the “protection against vote dilution recognized by our prior cases . . . as a mini-
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sioned.  Given the keen importance of basic municipal services and avoid-
ance of police brutality to the Mobile African American community, there 
surely were issues of greater importance to a fraction of white voters who 
could coalesce with black voters for a majority coalition.  Indeed, white 
business leaders, as well as African American neighborhood activists, were 
stymied by the policies of the Mobile commissioners.  However, in the po-
larized politics of 1970s Alabama, a bi-racial coalition was not possible; any 
effort to solicit black votes would result in a strong “white backlash.”170 
In contrast, significant municipal legislation advancing rights of same-
sex couples and limiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
was adopted by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors at a time when 
LGBTQ voters played a major role as a faction within the governing coali-
tion.171  The political dynamic at the time featured some candidates primar-
ily concerned with promoting business development and others with pro-
tecting neighborhoods from undue development.172  Many candidates 
	
mally intrusive guarantee of political survival for a discrete political minority that is effectively 
locked out of governmental decisionmaking processes”); id. at 98 (White, J., dissenting) (observing 
that such backlash tended to exist in a state of “severe racial polarization” of voting patterns, 
“with ‘white voting for white and black voting for black if a white is opposed to a black,’ resulting 
in the defeat of the black candidate or, if two whites are running, the defeat of the white candidate 
most identified with blacks.” (quoting Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 388)). 
 170 Id. (detailing how “[c]ity officials and police were largely unmoved by Negro complaints about 
policy brutality and ‘mock lynching,’” perhaps because a “‘political fear of white backlash vote 
when black citizens’ needs are at stake.’” (quoting Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 392)).  Bolden played a 
prominent role in congressional debates over the passage of the 1982 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, and Congress ultimately decided to soften the decision’s strict intent requirements and 
instead allow proof of discrimination via assessment of the “totality of the circumstances.”  52 
U.S. Code § 10301(b) (2016).  See generally Thomas M. Boyd & Stephen J. Markman, The 1982 
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Legislative History, 40 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1347 (1983).  The 
political dynamic described herein was, of course, even more obvious prior to passage of the Vot-
ing Rights Act.  As David Strauss points out: 
It was the kiss of death for a politician in a Jim Crow state to be seen as aligned with Af-
rican Americans; indeed, politicians competed with each other to declare their hostility 
to civil rights for African Americans.  In 1938, there was not much doubt about what at 
least one “discrete and insular minority,” subject to prejudice, looked like. 
  Strauss, Carolene Products, supra note 16, at 1258 (citing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM 
CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 
10–17 (2004) (describing the historical factors related to the “deterioration of race relations [that] 
grew out of the interplay between regional developments and national ones.”)). 
 171 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
130 (1999) (noting San Francisco’s passage in 1978 of an ordinance prohibiting discrimination in 
employment, housing, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 172  See, e.g., RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE & TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 
69 (1982) (describing an interaction between Supervisor Milk (who was openly gay) and prospective 
voters in which he centered his candidacy on opposition to runaway development and on preserv-
ing tracts of low-income housing); id. at 194 (noting squabbles between Milk and developers on the 
campaign trail, and describing as the “centerpiece of Milk’s legislative agenda” an “ordinance to 
discourage the real estate speculation that was running rampant throughout San Francisco”); see al-
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realized that failure to embrace a gay rights agenda would cost them sup-
port from LGBTQ voters, who constituted an important element of the 
electorate.  Indeed, one local politician defeated in a mayoral primary by 
candidates with stronger LGBTQ support observed that the “gay vote is a 
key element for any elected official in San Francisco.”173  Of critical im-
portance, endorsing additional protections for LGBTQ San Franciscans 
would not cost candidates among most straight voters.174    
These examples illustrate (a) the sort of antipathy that Vance v. Bradley 
presumes does not ordinarily exist in the political process, in contrast to (b) 
the Madisonian dynamics that are more typical.  Usually, groups whose 
policy preferences are not shared by the majority of voters lose.  But most 
voters have varying intensity of preferences with regard to the myriad issues 
facing their elected officials.  If improvident legislation is really unfair in 
targeting a particular faction, then ordinarily that faction can trade their 
support on issues of lesser concern for success in redressing their particular 
grievances.  The adamant opposition of active members of the National Ri-
fle Association to restrictions on firearms possession well-illustrates this 
point.175  While the white majority in Mobile may have been concerned 
about issues of minor importance to African Americans, black residents 
were primarily interested about decent sidewalks, municipal services, and 
fair police practices in their community.  While the straight majority in San 
Francisco may have been concerned about environmental and economic 
issues, LGBTQ residents were focused primarily on ending discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation.176 
	
so Robert Reinhold, Divided San Francisco Eyes Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 1987), http://www. 
nytimes.com/1987/10/21/us/divided-san-francisco-eyes-election.html?pagewanted=all (showing 
that two gay Democratic clubs divided between two mayoral candidates, and, with gay-rights is-
sues “thus neutralized, the main issues are affordable housing, rent control, downtown growth, 
fiscal problems and neighborhoods.”).   
 173 DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE STRUGGLE TO BUILD A 
GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 344 (1999) (quoting Supervisor John Molinari).  LGBTQ 
support was critical in the coalition electing George Moscone mayor over a more conservative 
opponent.  Id. 
 174 Indeed, infamous county supervisor Dan White, who later assassinated Mayor Moscone and Su-
pervisor Milk, only voted against an anti-discrimination ordinance after Milk refused to support 
an unrelated municipal initiative that White was championing.  SHILTS, supra note 172, at 198.  
We thank Professor Matthew Coles, a former ACLU advocate instrumental in securing adoption 
of gay rights legislation, for his insights in this regard. 
 175 The ability of even smaller groups to have an outsized influence on politics because of their ability 
to pour vast financial resources into campaigns supporting or opposing candidates based on spe-
cific issues is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 176 As Wojciech Sadurski observes:  
The enthusiasts of a pluralistic model of politics claim that the political power of minori-
ties is actualized through their entering alliances and coalitions with each other: by form-
ing mutually beneficial pacts various minoritarian groups can amplify their political in-
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The key to our contrast between these case studies is not simply the re-
sults.  As Justice Marshall emphasized, results are not the concern of a judi-
cial inquiry into an inability to participate equally in the political process.  
Rather, the significant dynamic was that Mobile’s black voters were sys-
tematically ignored until white business leaders could credibly form allianc-
es with black leaders.  In San Francisco, LGBTQ voters were the objects of 
keen competition for coalition-building by other factions.  These factors 
must be the center of the inquiry.   
For these reasons, we disagree with those judicial decisions finding that 
LGBTQ voters were not powerless because they were able to secure some 
legislative victories or elect some members to office.  As Jane Schacter ob-
serves, the passage of anti-discrimination legislation protecting a group 
from some obstacles may be evidence that there is sufficient societal preju-
dice directed at the group in respect to other matters to warrant judicial 
protection by way of heightened review of other decisions that may affect 
such matters.177  As Bertrall Ross and Su Li observe, prior legislation bar-
ring discrimination against a group might reflect now-outmoded ideological 
preferences and thus do not demonstrate a current ability of that group to 
redress grievances politically.178  (Beyond the scope of this Article is the 
workability question of how the federal courts should treat groups that may 
	
fluence on these issues where their particular interests are affected.  But the whole point 
of Carolene is that to some groups this path is not available: for instance because they are 
too weak economically to effectively play political games, or so unpopular among the 
electorate that supporting their cause is for politicians a liability rather than an asset, or 
because widespread social stereotyping makes other groups unwilling to enter into coali-
tions with them. These are all objective indicia of disability related to the past history of le-
gal and social discrimination, to a lower social status of a group, and to objective victimi-
sation by popular ideologies. 
  Sadurski, supra note 11, at 179 (citing ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
IDEA OF PROGRESS 83 (1970)). 
 177 Schacter, supra note 94, at 1382, 1394.  As prejudice evolves, it is common for many to show out-
rage at particular forms of discrimination but tolerate others.  Many abolitionists were racists.  See 
Richard B. Russell, “Talking of Unconscionable Niggers . . .,” 104 HARV. L. REV. 1949, 1950 (1991) 
(reviewing WILLIAM S. MCFEELY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1991)).  Civil rights advocates took 
particular care to focus public and judicial attention on discrimination in public education rather 
than discriminatory statutes banning inter-racial marriage.  See Dorothy E. Roberts, Loving v. 
Virginia As A Civil Rights Decision, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 175, 183–85, 192 (2015) (describing the 
NAACP’s strategic choice to avoid interracial marriage ban litigation).  Grudging supporters of 
civil rights legislation were more comfortable barring discrimination in public accommodations 
than in employment.  See Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Ismail Alsheik, A Missing Piece: Fair Housing and 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 48 HOW. L.J. 841, 861–62, (2005) (explaining how efforts to curtail dis-
crimination in employment floundered while lobbyists sought school desegregation). 
 178 Ross & Li, supra note 145, at 380 (“In relying on favorable legislative actions as the measure of 
political power, the Supreme Court overlooks other reasons why legislators support laws, includ-
ing partisanship and ideology. Because a simple count of favorable legislative actions is not neces-
sarily proof of a group’s political power, the Court should supplement this measure with others.”).  
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be courted in some states and localities and remain pariahs in others.) 
Particularly when evaluating electoral practices, the Court has in some 
cases focused on the inability of racial minorities to form multi-racial politi-
cal coalitions.179  This inability was one of several factors upon which the 
Court found a Texas reapportionment scheme unconstitutional.  The Court 
examined actual results (virtually no minority race candidates elected to the 
legislature), but also considered the lack of appeal to African American vot-
ers by successful candidates, and “racial campaign tactics” directed to white 
voters to defeat candidates who enjoyed support of African American vot-
ers.180  In contrast, the Court had previously upheld an Indiana reappor-
tionment scheme against claims that having all candidates from Marion 
County (metropolitan Indianapolis) run on a county-wide basis diluted black 
votes.  Although recent elections resulted in a disproportionately low num-
ber of African American state representatives, the Court concluded this was 
due to the partisan defeat of the Democratic Party, which included African 
American candidates and relied heavily on black votes for its success.181 
Justice Marshall’s insights bring clarity to a judicially-manageable test 
	
 179 In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 US. 55 (1980), the Court held that proof of a Fifteenth Amendment 
violation required more than an inability to participate in the political process.  Id. at 75.  Rather, 
the Court required a showing that state electoral statutes were adopted for the purpose of discrimi-
nating against minority race voters.  Id. at 65–66.  In that case, the challenged at-large scheme of 
electing municipal legislators had been enacted in the early 1900s, when African Americans were 
effectively precluded from voting.  Id. at 58.  Thus, the Court reasoned, racial discrimination could 
not have been the purpose of the at-large requirement.  Id. at 69–74.  Exercising its powers under 
section 2 of that Amendment, Congress responded by enacting the Voting Rights Act of 1982 to 
overturn Bolden and direct courts to focus on whether the purpose or effect of state practices de-
prived specific groups of their ability to participate equally in the political process.  In determining 
whether a state’s electoral practices constitute illegal vote dilution, one scholar has observed: 
Behind each judicial determination that a particular voting system frustrates the electoral 
aspirations of minority voters stands an indictment of majoritarian processes.  The racial-
ly polarized voting inquiry gives the Court a healthy basis for skepticism concerning the 
majoritarian premise implicit in respect for the outcomes of elections. 
  Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation of Voting Rights Jurispru-
dence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1860 (1992).  Among those who may seek to demonstrate, pursu-
ant to the argument of this Article, that the political process cannot be relied upon to protect 
them and thus close scrutiny is justified under the Due Process Clause, some particular tests used 
in Voting Rights Act litigation may be appropriate, but a detailed analysis of any particular claim 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 180 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973) (“[A]s recently as 1970 [organizations were] relying upon 
‘racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support of 
the black community.’” (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 727 (W.D. Tex. 1972)). 
 181 As the court noted in Whitcomb v. Chavis: 
The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of Marion 
County elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its own pro-
vides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where, as here, there is no indication 
that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system. 
  403 U.S. 124, 153–55 (1971). 
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for political powerlessness.  It accepts Justice Stone’s presumption that, or-
dinarily, those aggrieved by government action can protect themselves 
through the political process.  It properly focuses on the extraordinary ina-
bility of those claimants who cannot build coalitions to redress grievances.  
In this way, it responds to the criticism of political science-influenced legal 
scholars who correctly observe that claimants in this category are not lim-
ited to minorities who are “discrete and insular.”182 
C.  Substantive Due Process Under Footnote Four 
As we illustrate in Part IV, it is difficult to imagine many claims war-
ranting careful scrutiny that involve government activity applied generally 
rather than selectively.  Nonetheless, courts should continue to engage in 
heightened scrutiny if a challenger demonstrates that a putative “right” has 
been infringed because those adversely affected cannot meaningfully use 
the political process to “wheel and deal” with others to secure a redress of 
their grievances on similar terms to other stakeholders.  This would occur 
when animus or prejudice is directed not at a demographic group (as in 
equal protection analysis), but at a group defined by the conduct in which 
they wish to engage. 
Reasoning by analogy should govern how the rigorous application of 
process theory to substantive due process claims would evolve.  Claimants 
whose grievances seem more akin to the Carolene Products Company 
should lose.  Claimants whose grievances seem more akin to those groups 
recognized by the Court to be in need of heightened scrutiny—racial and 
religious minorities, non-citizens, and (at least for now) women—should se-
cure close scrutiny.  Exemplifying this approach, the Connecticut Supreme 
	
 182 One such legal scholar provided: 
Except for special cases, the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect 
groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes—
groups that are “anonymous and diffuse” rather than “discrete and insular.”  It is these 
groups that both political science and American history indicate are systematically disad-
vantaged in a pluralist democracy. 
  Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–24 (1985).  For an 
insightful response to Ackerman’s critique, with regard to how ideological or other prejudice 
could preclude politicians from entering into coalitions with certain groups, see Farber & Frickey, 
supra note 78, at 700–01.  In particular, they observe that “part of the ‘political processes ordinari-
ly to be relied upon to protect minorities’ may be a legislator’s ideological commitment to fair 
treatment, which may not extend to ‘second-class citizens.’”  Id. at 702.  Moreover, the authors 
note that the public choice theory of advantages to insular groups touted by critics of Carolene 
Products suggests that discrete and insular minorities have advantages in bargaining.  Under this 
theory, minority groups should almost always preclude a bloc voting majority from defeating 
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular minority group.  However, 
numerous lower courts have found, in Voting Rights Act litigation, that bloc voting to preclude 
effective political participation of racial minorities is precisely what has occurred.  Id. at 707. 
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Court, applying to a state constitutional challenge what it perceived to be 
the same equal protection methodology that federal courts use,183 justified 
close judicial scrutiny for a sexual orientation classification on the ground 
that LGBTQ individuals had less political power than racial minorities or 
women.184  Likewise, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned (in dictum) that 
claims of the mentally retarded did not justify heightened scrutiny, because 
the degree of their powerlessness could not be meaningfully distinguished 
from many other economic or social claimants.185 
Because public choice theory demonstrates distortions in the political 
process, some commentators contend that federal judges should closely re-
view a wide variety of due process challenges.186  In our judgment, Justice 
Stone had it right: this sets the bar too low.  Indeed, scholars have shown 
that this may well have been the case in Carolene Products itself.187  The dis-
tinction between public interest legislation and special interest legislation is 
ordinarily in the eye of the beholder.  For example, some critics have sug-
gested that environmental laws reflect special interest pleading by clean in-
dustries;188 at the same time, industry defenders of captured federal agen-
cies often maintain that the regulatory regime is superior public policy to 
the vagaries of an unregulated market.  Giving judges the discretion to 
closely scrutinize any legislation that might have resulted in some unfair 
advantages in the political process would invite the same constitutional cri-
sis that Carolene Products was designed to prevent.  Rather, as the Court has 
held with regard to equal protection jurisprudence, the focus should be on 
whether the claimant can provide a justification for “extraordinary protec-
	
 183 Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423 (Conn. 2008) (“On occasion intermediate 
scrutiny as been applied to review of a law that affects an important, though not constitutional, right.”).  
 184 Id. at 452–54. 
 185 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).  The Court nonetheless 
concluded that a particular zoning ordinance was borne of “an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded” and thus failed the rational basis test.  Id. at 450. 
 186 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 201 n.20 (1997) (“[T]he Constitution should be as concerned with 
guarding against the power of the concentrated minorities as it is with protecting discrete and in-
sular minorities.”). 
 187 See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397 
(1987).  Miller concluded that the challenged statute was “an utterly unprincipled example of spe-
cial interest legislation.”  Id. at 398.  The effect was to deprive consumers “of a healthful, nutri-
tious, and low-cost food” and to harm children’s health by “encouraging the use as baby food” of 
a rival product that was 42% sugar.  Id. at 399.  Miller’s point is that Footnote Four thus demon-
strates the Court’s determination to “keep its hands off economic regulation, no matter how egre-
gious the discrimination or patent the special interest motivation.”  Id. 
 188 See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 
896 n.140 (1987) (listing articles discussing this criticism). 
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tion from the majoritarian political process.”189    
To best illustrate our theory, we offer an example from recent history.  A 
large number of states have legalized medical marijuana.190  We are not 
aware of evidence that the political processes in those states continuing to 
prohibit demonstrably ill people from achieving symptomatic relief from de-
rivatives of cannabis (assuming the laws are actively enforced) are distorted 
by animus or prejudice.  However, it is almost certainly true that this was 
the case several decades ago, when many voters and their representatives 
attributed marijuana use to a “drug counter-culture.”191  In that context, ef-
forts by advocates of medical marijuana to trade the votes of their supporters 
for other political concessions may well have failed, because of the hostility 
that was a part of the cultural wars of the late twentieth century.  To be sure, 
such laws might still survive careful scrutiny on demonstration of alternative 
means of symptomatic relief or of undue risks that medical marijuana would 
be diverted to illegal markets.192  But the Carolene Products’s presumption of 
rational basis review ought to have been dispensed with if claimants could 
have made a persuasive case regarding prejudice to their marijuana use. 
For over seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has sought to deal with 
the “counter-majoritarian dilemma” by doctrines that explicitly or implicitly 
reflect an independent judicial determination that the political process was 
inadequate to protect those aggrieved by government action that infringes 
unenumerated liberties.  Although the Court’s articulation of “inadequacy” is 
incomplete and sometimes muddled, a body of constitutional principles and 
doctrines that limit free reign of judicial discretion—i.e. limiting principles—
	
 189 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see, e.g., Bertrall L. Ross II & 
Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 324 
(2016) (describing the high burden of demonstrating that a class is politically powerless).  Overall, 
lower courts have been markedly inconsistent in their attempts to apply the Rodriguez factors to 
new claimants.  See David Schraub, Note, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection 
in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437, 1453–60 (2010) (discussing inconsistent appli-
cation of the “politically powerless” label in gay rights litigation). 
 190 See D. Mark Anderson, Benjamin Hansen & Daniel I. Rees, Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatali-
ties, and Alcohol Consumption, 56 J.L. & ECON. 333, 334 (2013) (discussing the proliferation of medi-
cal marijuana laws among the states).  In 2016, voters in California, Nevada, Maine, and Massa-
chusetts voted to legalize recreational marijuana use.  Legal Marijuana and a Higher Minimum Wage: 
States That Passed Key Ballot Measures in 2016, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2016, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/datadesign/2016/11/11/legal-marijuana-and-a-higher-minimum-
wage-states-that-passed-key-ballot-measures-in-2016/#4ddfcb937cb9.  Montana, North Dakota, 
Arkansas, and Florida all voted to legalize medical marijuana use.  Id.  Arizona, which requires a 
super-majority, rejected marijuana legalization even though 52% of voters supported it.  Id. 
 191 Powell, supra note 6, at 1090 (arguing, by way of example, that the “drug cult” could be consid-
ered a “discrete and insular minority” in some sense). 
 192 This was the rational basis that the Court used to uphold the effect of medical marijuana on inter-
state markets in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005). 
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require a principled application of the limit.  Creating a presumption of 
validity for most legislative acts, while reserving close scrutiny for only some 
legislative acts, requires clear criteria for distinguishing between the two.  
Here, we recommend for judicial consideration a test of political 
powerlessness focusing on inability to “wheel and deal,” as suggested by 
Professor Ely and explicated by Justice Marshall.  A constitutional theory 
based on the political process requires judges to judge the political process.   
As we have conceded earlier, our approach is neither perfect nor value-
free.  A judicial determination that prejudice animates laws against private 
homosexual conduct but not laws against indecent exposure does require 
judges to make a substantive value choice.193  The judicial decision, 
however, would not be based on the judge’s view of which right is 
“fundamental” in a substantive sense of moral philosophy.194  As Professor 
Lawrence Sager explained: 
The initial premise is that there are indeed rights—a significant body of prin-
ciples derived from the Constitution—that restrain governmental deci-
sionmaking.  It is then observed that the majoritarian processes of govern-
ment are unreliable as respecters of at least some of these rights, and that the 
judiciary thus has a legitimate role in the articulation and enforcement of 
these rights.  On this reading, rights themselves exist independent of process; 
it is the claim for active judicial enforcement of rights that is process-based.195 
We therefore disagree with process theory critics who claim that the 
substantive value choices required to assess whether the political process is 
reliable are indistinguishable from the value choices required using substan-
tive theories of justice or fundamental rights.196  To illustrate, consider a 
	
 193 See ELY, supra note 9, at 152 (emphasis added) (stating that prejudice is where a minority is 
“barred from the pluralist’s bazaar, and thus finding itself on the wrong end of the legislature’s 
classifications, for reasons that in some sense are discreditable”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 78, at 698 
(arguing that Carolene Products’s “broader spirit” is “solicitude for ‘out-groups’” in its reliance on 
prejudice, and “the difference between a prejudice and a justified preference is normative”).  We 
agree with Professor Klarman that a theory of prejudice cannot be void of substance, as that term 
was used by Justice Stone and further refined by Professor Ely to include both the refusal to deal 
with others out of simple hostility as well as a systematic devaluing of a particular group’s interests 
through stereotypical judgments.  Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance, supra note 12, at 784.  Given 
our project of using political process theory to minimize and channel, rather than eliminate, judi-
cial value judgments, we do not share Klarman’s view that a process-based jurisprudence must be 
“shorn of its prejudice prong.”  Id. at 819; cf. Strauss, Carolene Products, supra note 16, at 1266 
(emphasis added) (“[T]he entire point of the Carolene Products approach is to enable courts to avoid 
controversial moral issues” like homosexuality). 
 194 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 
1063, 1075–76 (1980) (stating that legislation against homosexuals is based on principles of moral-
ity which view certain sexual activities as wrong). 
 195 Lawrence G. Sager, Constitutional Triage, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 707, 717 (1981) (reviewing CHOPER, 
supra note 10). 
 196 See, e.g., Ortiz, supra note 123, at 735 (noting a switch in Ely’s work from a purely political focus to 
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challenge to a statute requiring mandatory sterilization of persons afflicted 
with mental retardation.197  Although the Supreme Court has previously 
found that this group is not politically powerless (in the context of a land 
use challenge),198 the question judges should answer under our approach 
does not go to the substance of the propriety of sterilization.  Rather, we 
suggest that judges examine the legislative process to ascertain why advo-
cates for people with intellectual disabilities were unable to prevent enact-
ment of the legislation.  In sum, although a political science inquiry into 
prejudice is not value-free, it is more constrained than a moral philosophy 
inquiry into defining fundamental rights.199 
IV. WHAT WOULD RIGOROUS APPLICATION OF PROCESS THEORY 
LOOK LIKE? 
We agree with Justice Stone that the political process ordinarily works to 
protect groups unfairly aggrieved by legislation.  We also agree with Justice 
Jackson that the most effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and un-
reasonable government is to require equal treatment.200  Thus, we expect 
that the Supreme Court’s need to carefully scrutinize legislative actions un-
der the Due Process Clause would be quite rare.  For most due process 
claimants, rational basis review would remain in place.201  For most of the 
remaining group where there is a political process failure, the case would 
proceed on equal protection grounds.  However, when a claim cannot be 
resolved under equal protection principles, courts should consider extending 
	
a focus on the psychology of decision making). 
 197 Such a statute was infamously upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 208 (1927).   
 198 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435, 445 (1985); see also supra note 
185 and accompanying text. 
 199 If, as Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance, supra note 12, at 747, observes, John Hart Ely 
sought to “confront, or perhaps more accurately to circumvent, the countermajoritarian difficul-
ty,” then our goal is rather to minimize it. 
 200 See supra text accompanying notes 137–41. 
 201 Courts have found laws to lack rational basis when the judge concludes that the statute is not mo-
tivated by a rational basis but by an irrational animus.  See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 
(1996) (noting that a constitutional amendment limiting a local government’s ability to redress an-
ti-LGBTQ discrimination “seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; 
it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests”).  Another scenario for judicial invali-
dation of a statute as lacking a rational basis would be an outmoded law that neither the govern-
ment nor any intervenor defends.  Cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501–02 (1961) (Frankfurter, 
J.) (discussing a law passed in 1879 prohibiting the use of contraceptives which never gave rise to 
government prosecutions despite open sale of contraceptives); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme 
Court, 1960 Term—Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 59 (1961) (detailing the min-
imal instances in which a Connecticut law against contraceptives was used to prosecute individu-
als providing access to contraceptives). 
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meaningful judicial protection from majoritarian political processes to some 
substantive due process claimants.  To justify heightened protection, these 
claimants must demonstrate that animus or prejudice (as we have used that 
term)202 precludes their ability to participate equally with other stakeholders 
in the political process.  In this Part, we suggest how our proposed reinvig-
oration of Carolene Products would apply in a variety of instances.203  We con-
clude that courts applying this new standard would reach similar results un-
der equal protection jurisprudence in many cases where current doctrine 
permits heightened substantive due process review.  The most likely areas 
where doctrine might evolve differently are claims involving family law, dep-
rivation of “fundamental” rights by the poor, and the exercise of religiously-
based practices not protected by current Free Exercise Clause doctrine.  
A.  Desirability of Resolving Cases Under the Equal Protection Clause 
One illustration of our thesis concerns the Court’s long line of cases 
wrestling with a satisfactory basis for according close scrutiny to laws affect-
ing family privacy.  Many of these cases may be better resolved under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Where a political process analysis does not justify 
close scrutiny, we believe that the decisions were wrong. 
We begin with two cases often cited as the progenitors of a right to pri-
vacy recognized under the Due Process Clause.204  In Meyer v. Nebraska, the 
Court reversed the conviction of a private school teacher for teaching (dur-
ing recess) reading in the German language, in violation of a state law out-
lawing instruction in other languages before ninth grade.205  In Pierce v. So-
ciety of Sisters, the Court invalidated an Oregon statute requiring students to 
	
 202 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
 203 We do not discuss the potential application of this doctrine to the issue of regulatory takings.  The 
Court’s muddled doctrine in this area may well benefit from a rigorous reconsideration (for an in-
sightful analysis, see Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism as Obligation 
to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411 (2009)), and Carolene Products’s political process ap-
proach may make an important contribution to such reconsideration.  But the Court’s current doc-
trinal rules suggest that these claims are analyzed as “takings” of “property.”  See Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540, 548 (2005) (reversing a claim because it was not a taking and apply-
ing rational basis review to the due process claim); Colburn, supra, at 1448 (stating that the Court of-
ten examines confiscation of property under a Takings Clause analysis).  Thus, following the frame-
work of Footnote Four, these claims are arguably—today, at least—with regard to rights “within a 
specific prohibition in the Constitution,” and beyond the scope of substantive due process.  Cf. Col-
burn, supra, at 1440 (stating that although Lingle “minimized the degree to which substantive due pro-
cess and takings scrutiny had mixed,” in truth “these two had virtually merged”). 
 204 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (identifying those two cases that rec-
ognized rights to make choices about education). 
 205 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923). 
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attend public schools through the eighth grade.206  Both decisions took 
place in the midst of the Lochner era.  In Meyer, Justice James McReynolds 
explained that the statute interfered with liberty guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment, which the Court defined as: 
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individu-
al to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to ac-
quire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and gener-
ally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.207 
This articulation obviously is much broader, and grounded in a far dif-
ferent constitutional theory, than the one the Court would later articulate in 
Carolene Products.  We believe that close judicial scrutiny in these cases may 
be better justified today on alternative grounds: by determining whether 
there was a sufficient likelihood that the Nebraska statute reflected preju-
dice based on national origin directed at German-Americans in the wake of 
World War I, and whether the Oregon statute reflected prejudice against 
those religions (particularly Roman Catholicism) that required adherents’ 
children to attend parochial schools.  Under our approach, this would raise 
questions about the ability of the political process to adequately balance 
conflicting policy interests in these cases.  These become equality cases, not 
ones of substantive due process. 
In a similar vein, we believe that state laws limiting the sale of contra-
ceptive devices or medication would be unlikely to survive politically if the 
laws were uniformly applied.208  As enforced, the Connecticut statute inval-
idated in Griswold realistically posed no real barrier to most married couples 
in that state, but only to those who were poor.  Comparably, the Massachu-
setts law struck down in Eisenstadt, which limited sales of contraceptive de-
vices to married couples, allegedly seeking to limit premarital sex, had pre-
viously survived equal protection review despite the legislature’s decision to 
permit over-the-counter condom sales.209 
As to whether federal judges should depart from the Carolene Products’s 
presumption of rational basis review for legislative restrictions on a wom-
an’s ability to terminate a pregnancy,210 there is much to the view that 
abortion restrictions should be closely justified on equal protection grounds, 
	
 206 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925). 
 207 262 U.S. at 399. 
 208 We discuss this in our text accompanying supra notes 140–42. 
 209 See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Contraception as a Sex Equality Right, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 349, 
352 (2015) (discussing Commonwealth v. Corbett, 29 N.E.2d 151 (Mass. 1940)). 
 210 Given the scope of this Article, we do not discuss the precise doctrines that should emerge from 
equal protection scrutiny of particular abortion-restricting statutes. 
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as uniquely applying to women, for the same reasons that discrimination 
against women continues to be closely justified.211  Justice Bertha Wilson of 
the Supreme Court of Canada articulated this position in her concurring 
judgment to Canada’s counterpart to Roe v. Wade.212  She noted that a deci-
sion on whether to have an abortion is one with profound effects for the 
pregnant woman, with complex and varied circumstances usually resulting 
in “powerful considerations militating in opposite directions.”213  Justice 
Wilson observed that it is: 
probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to such a di-
lemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal experience 
(although this is, of course, the case) but because he can relate to it only by 
objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective elements of the female 
psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.214 
For this reason, the “right to reproduce or not to reproduce . . . is properly 
perceived as an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her dig-
nity and worth as a human being.”215 
Our analysis also makes us reluctant to base the result in Obergefell v. 
Hodges216 protecting same-sex marriage on the importance of marriage to 
our society and to the parties in the litigation.  As earlier noted, prior cases 
suggest that legislation motivated by animus may be said to be irrational 
(because, like “love,” it is based on emotion rather than analytic reasoning).  
Consequently, the challenged limits on marriage fail even the deferential 
test set forth in Carolene Products.217  Indeed, Justice Kennedy himself had 
found such animus in other cases classifying on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion.218  We believe that heightened scrutiny would be better justified by a 
judicial finding that, despite significant changes in social attitudes, irrational 
prejudice and stereotype remain in a significant number of states, thus war-
	
 211 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that “legal 
challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized 
notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and 
thus to enjoy equal citizenship status.” (citing Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. 
PA. L. REV. 955, 1002–28 (1984); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abor-
tion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992)). 
 212 R. v. Morgentaler., [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30, 161–84 (Can.) (Wilson, J., concurring). 
 213  Id. at 171. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 172. 
 216 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 217 See, e.g., Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 US. 528, 534–35 (1973) (holding that “a bare congres-
sional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate government inter-
est”). 
 218 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 768 (2013) (finding that DOMA was “designed to 
injure” a class of persons); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (holding that the challenged 
law was “born of animosity toward the class of persons affected”). 
May 2018]    POLITICAL PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION, & SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 1033 
	
ranting the conclusion that legislation targeting Americans on the basis of 
sexual orientation will not be corrected by the political process.219 
The same-sex marriage issue also illustrates another important limita-
tion on our thesis.  Many states adopted restrictions on same-sex marriage 
through direct democracy by initiatives or referenda.  Our approach would 
require a different doctrine for review of these cases.  Justice Stone’s as-
sumption that minorities can usually protect themselves in the political pro-
cess is premised on the Madisonian compromises with other factions that 
occur regularly as part of political bargaining among elected legislators.  This 
assumes that minorities can prevail by obtaining support for policies that 
may be weakly opposed by the majority, in exchange for their own support 
for other policies strongly favored by other factions.  This sort of wheeling 
and dealing is nearly impossible to achieve on single-issue questions pre-
sented directly to voters, where the minority will almost always lose.220 
B.  Return to San Antonio 
Reinvigoration of Carolene Products invites a review of the Court’s incon-
clusive jurisprudence concerning claims of the poor.  We emphasize again 
that our argument for application of political process theory to these chal-
lenging issues focuses solely on standards that justify close judicial scrutiny.  
It may be that further careful examination will reveal that poor claimants 
meet the standard we articulate here; whether there is a workable and judi-
cially manageable standard to secure relief for their particular claims is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
The Supreme Court has never fully considered whether, in respect to 
any specific legislative policy choice, the political process is adequate to pro-
tect the poor.  Specifically, San Antonio v. Rodriguez did not reject the claim 
that the poor were a “Carolene minority.”  Rather, the Court rejected the 
argument that the plaintiff’s challenge to Texas’s school financing scheme 
discriminated against the poor as a class.221  As Ross and Li persuasively 
	
 219 Cf. text accompanying notes 105–10, supra, justifying heightened scrutiny of gender-based legisla-
tion based on continuing obstacles to the political process for women. 
 220 Accord Schacter, supra note 94, at 1395, 1403 (discussing the political access or power of minority 
groups); see also Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black 
Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1100 (1991) (explaining  the concept that multi-racial 
legislative bodies are needed because “only after previously excluded groups were successful with-
in the electoral process would the white majority learn to accept black representatives as col-
leagues in collective governance”). 
 221 The Court noted:  
[A]ppellees have made no effort to demonstrate that it operates to the peculiar disad-
vantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons whose in-
comes are beneath any designated poverty level.  Indeed, there is reason to believe that 
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demonstrate, language in later opinions, stating that poverty is not a “sus-
pect” classification, was entirely bootstrapped from earlier language and did 
not represent a considered rejection of a claim under either the standards 
set forth in Footnote Four or in Rodriguez.222 
The expenditure of funds is surely subject to constitutional equality ju-
risprudence.  If Texas had provided unequal funding based on a formula 
explicitly affording less per-pupil spending for schools with higher percent-
ages of minority race students, this would be unconstitutional.  So too 
would a scheme funding programs for boys and not for girls.223  But it 
would read too much into the insights provided by Justices Stone, Jackson, 
and Marshall to find a judicially enforceable constitutional mandate to 
remedy wealth inequality by ordering additional resources (either from 
higher taxes or redistribution from different government programs).   
Under Footnote Four, the principal focus with regard to claims of the 
poor is whether they face antipathy that precludes their ability to “wheel 
and deal” in the legislative process.  While resolving this issue is beyond the 
scope of this Article, recent work by Ross and Li offer some important in-
sights.  We agree with them that the presence (or lack thereof) of impover-
ished representatives in Congress or state legislatures is not dispositive, nor 
is the existence of some programs designed to alleviate poverty (especially 
those enacted many years ago based on different ideological motivations of 
elected officials).224  We find most salient, regarding their extensive empiri-
cal study of voting in the House of Representatives, evidence that the pres-
ence of poor voters in a congressional district correlates negatively to voting 
on legislation that would benefit the poor—in stark contrast to statistically 
significant positive correlations between voting and the presence in a dis-
trict of union members and farmers.225 
We are more ambivalent about their finding that significantly lower vot-
ing levels in poor precincts also explains the lack of responsiveness of legis-
latures to the needs of the poor.  We appreciate the cycle of despair that 
could lead poor Americans to withdraw from the political process.226  How-
ever, we do not believe that this poses the sort of barrier to participation an-
ticipated in Footnote Four.  Part of ordinary politics is that some groups 
	
the poorest families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts. 
  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1973). 
 222 See Ross & Li, supra note 145, at 331, 333, 342–43 (recounting how Maher v. Roe and Harris v. 
McRae misused Rodriguez to refuse to declare the poor a suspect class). 
 223 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534–46 (1996) (holding that an all-male state 
university violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 224 Ross & Li, supra note 145, at 348–49. 
 225 Id. at 367. 
 226 Id. at 378. 
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may be easier to organize, and others may require particularly charismatic 
candidates, or more fervent and creative efforts to increase voter participa-
tion, to be able to ensure that the political process addresses their concerns.  
To be sure, however, if low rates of political participation are due to laws 
designed to impede voting, then—per the second paragraph of Footnote 
Four—courts should carefully scrutinize those electoral laws.227  On the 
other hand, if the principal cause of unresponsiveness is voter ennui rather 
than legislative hostility, active judicial intervention should not proceed. 
To justify heightened scrutiny under Carolene Products, a poor plaintiff 
would need to clearly identify unequal treatment of a discrete class of the 
poor, and then demonstrate why that class warrants extraordinary protec-
tion from majoritarian political processes.  In the context of a renewed 
challenge to school financing schemes, we offer a few thoughts as to how 
judges should analyze this issue.  First, the plaintiff would need to show that 
the scheme specifically discriminates against the poor, as opposed to those 
who happen to live in low-property districts (or to show that people who 
live in low-property districts are systematically disabled from redressing 
their grievances politically).  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
state’s reliance on local property tax revenues as the principal sources of 
school funding was primarily motivated by a disregard for the needs of poor 
voters, rather than strongly held countervailing policy concerns (regarding 
local control, tax policy, and the like).  Thoughtful substantive judicial dis-
cretion is inevitable in making this determination, and evidence of such dis-
regard in prior unsuccessful efforts to use political processes to redress 
grievances would be highly relevant.228 
	
 227 See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 272 (5th Cir. 2016) (invalidating a Texas voter identifica-
tion law); NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 239 (4th Cir. 2016) (striking down as racially dis-
criminatory certain provisions of a North Carolina law requiring photo identification, which re-
duced early voting and eliminated same-day registration). 
 228 Legislative motivations fall on a spectrum, between statutes solely designed to prejudice a minori-
ty, see, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (noting a bizarre racial gerrymander to 
exclude almost all black voters from a city), to those clearly designed to fulfill a compelling state 
interest.  A judge persuaded that a claim is highly important to a challenger unable to secure legis-
lative relief, in the face of weak justifications, may well conclude that “prejudice” is at work.  For 
example, in Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979), seven Justices sparred over 
whether an absolute preference for any minimally qualified veteran for jobs in the Massachusetts 
civil service constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.  Feeney argued that less than 
2% of Massachusetts women were veterans (in part due to discriminatory federal military regula-
tions), and that forty-six states and the federal government recognized veterans in ways less exclu-
sionary than an absolute preference.  The majority rejected the claim, finding no evidence that 
the preference was enacted “because of” its adverse effects on women, rather than “in spite of” 
this effect.  Id. at 279.  On this specific point, we are inclined to agree with Justice Marshall’s dis-
senting opinion.  He notes that until 1971 the preference had not applied to jobs “especially call-
ing for women,” id. at 285 (Marshall, J., dissenting), thus rejecting the majority’s view that the ev-
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In a similar vein, we believe that the Court’s rejection of a challenge to 
a federal law providing medical aid to poor women for childbirth but not 
abortion should be reconsidered.229  The proper focus should be on the sort 
of medical care provided to indigent men, compared to indigent women.  
We question whether the political process worked when male-dominated 
legislatures enacted substantive restrictions on reproductive choice.  Indeed, 
the distinction here may well be analogized to a statute that funded care for 
prostate cancer but not ovarian cancer.230   
Under Caroline Products, the cases involving the poor also require a re-
characterization of other prior claims.  For example, in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, the majority declined to carefully scrutinize a Maryland law that 
capped welfare benefits for large families.231  Here, the relevant discrimina-
tion was not between the poor and other groups.  Assuming that the Mary-
land legislature was likely to provide the same amount of annual appropria-
tions for welfare no matter how it was allocated, the policy question would 
be whether more of it should go to poor families with a large number of 
children as opposed to poor families with only a few children.  The proper 
Carolene Products focus should have been on whether, as between these two 
groups, large families faced prejudice in the legislative process. 
C.  Family Law Generally 
Much of the constitutionalization of family law is not supported by a 
Carolene Products theory.232  The Court has granted extraordinary judicial 
protection from majoritarian political processes with regard to state laws 
affecting divorced parents seeking to shield their children from grandparent 
visitation.233  Lower courts have closely reviewed cases where state child 
	
idence did not show a “collateral goal of keeping women in a stereotypic and predefined place in 
the Massachusetts civil service.”  Id. at 279 (majority opinion).  That said, we are more ambivalent 
about whether the real issue in this case was sex discrimination.  As Justice Stevens (joined by Jus-
tice White) noted in his concurrence, in addition to the nearly three million women disadvantaged 
by the statute, there were almost two million disadvantaged non-veteran men.  Id. at 281 (Stevens, 
J., concurring).  It is unclear why these two groups’ combined political efforts would be insuffi-
cient to secure legislative redress, although under our approach a plaintiff would have the oppor-
tunity to make such a case. 
 229 See Harris v. Macrae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470–71 (1977). 
 230 Cf. ELY, supra note 9, at 248–49 n.52 (noting caustically that “the middle class is now effectively 
entitled to the abortions that prior to Roe v. Wade only those rich enough to fly to Japan could af-
ford, but the poor are not.  No Carolene Products Court this.”). 
 231 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970). 
 232 For the view that the Court’s constitutionalization of family law has resulted in both bad constitu-
tional doctrine and bad substantive family law, see David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of 
Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 530 (2008). 
 233 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (finding a visitation order to be unconstitutional). 
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welfare authorities subjected parents to termination proceedings,234 among 
others.  We believe that evidence is lacking that those adversely affected by 
these sorts of laws are saddled with such political disabilities that they can-
not get redress from the political process through ordinary factional combi-
nation with others who care more about other issues.  We understand the 
revulsion articulated in Justice Goldberg’s Goldfarb concurrence to a hypo-
thetical statute requiring sterilization of all husbands and wives after two 
children had been born to them.  However, there is no evidence in Ameri-
can history that such a law—broadly applied to cover all families—would 
ever be enacted by Congress or a state legislature (absent some apocalyptic 
scenario out of science fiction).235 
We believe that the political process theory provides an answer to the 
view that surely the Constitution must protect marital privacy or parental 
rights given their importance in American society.  It is the same answer to 
Chief Justice John Roberts’ argument in Sebelius that surely the Constitution 
must protect against Congress passing a statute forcing Americans to eat 
broccoli.236  These positions reflect an unwarranted lack of faith in the po-
litical process.  In short, neither Congress nor any state legislature would 
seriously consider significantly limiting marriage to all its citizens nor force 
Americans to eat broccoli.237 
D.  Personal Autonomy and the “Right to Die” 
As noted earlier,238 the Court’s rejection of substantive due process and 
equal protection claims regarding physician-assisted suicide exemplify the 
difficulties with the Court’s existing approach.  In our view, the same result 
	
 234 See, e.g., In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1374–77 (Utah 1982) (striking down a statute that permitted 
termination of parental rights based upon a finding that “such termination will be in the child’s 
best interests”). 
 235 If any subset of Americans were targeted by such an enormous intrusion into family life, an equal 
protection challenge building upon Justice Jackson’s Railway Express insight would likely be the 
preferred way to protect these citizens. 
 236 See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 558 (2011).   
 237 Michael Klarman articulates this well: 
[T]he fascinating aspect of the sterilization hypothetical is [Justice Goldberg’s] blithe as-
sumption that a law generating such widely spread costs (as opposed to one concentrat-
ing burdens upon a politically impotent minority as did the sterilization law in Skinner [v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942]) must be unconstitutional.  I would have thought that 
such a law could not pass a democratically elected legislature (Connecticut is not China, 
after all) unless the need for it was deemed compelling.  And if population concerns were 
sufficiently urgent that the majority was prepared to sterilize itself, what would justify the 
Supreme Court’s mandating that the balance be struck on the individual liberty side of 
the equation? 
  Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance, supra note 12, at 827. 
 238 See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text. 
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would be better achieved by invoking Carolene Products, which none of the 
Justices notably chose to cite.  The majority’s reliance on “roots” and “tradi-
tion” fails to meaningfully distinguish Lochner and is not reconcilable with Roe 
and Casey.  The concurring opinions by Justices Souter and Stevens, which 
involve what we would call close scrutiny, do not even attempt to identify 
flaws in the political process to warrant such scrutiny.  Justice O’Connor’s 
concise concurrence has much more to commend it, in our judgment: 
Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family 
member’s terminal illness.  There is no reason to think the democratic pro-
cess will not strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, 
mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and 
the State’s interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistaken-
ly or under pressure.  As the Court recognizes, States are presently under-
taking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and 
other related issues.  In such circumstances, “the . . . challenging task of 
crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . liberty interests is en-
trusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance.”239 
Unfortunately, while Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter sparred 
with each other’s handiwork, neither saw fit to explain why Justice 
O’Connor’s approach was not preferred.  Justice Breyer, in a separate con-
currence, opined that her “views, which I share, have greater legal signifi-
cance than the Court’s opinion suggests.”240 
Likewise, the Court’s companion equal protection opinion in Vacco v. 
Quill241 exemplifies the benefits of a Carolene Products approach.  Vacco upheld 
New York’s criminalization of assisted suicide against an equal protection 
challenge made by terminally ill patients who were not on life support, be-
cause those who were on life support could hasten death by ending treat-
ment.242  The Court concluded that it was “important and logical; it is cer-
tainly rational” to distinguish between assisting suicide and withdrawing 
life-sustaining treatment.243  It went on to offer additional reasons suggest-
ing that the Justices actually agreed with the legislative distinction.244 
Our approach, echoing Justice O’Connor’s, would ask whether those citi-
zens who support physician-assisted suicide (either for themselves or loved 
ones) are precluded by prejudice or animosity from securing desired legislative 
	
 239 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).   
 240 Id. at 789 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 241 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
 242 Id. at 796–98. 
 243 Id. at 800–01 (citation omitted). 
 244 Id. at 801–09 (supporting their finding by differentiating between refusing treatment and assisted 
suicide based on traditional legal notions of causation and intent that “not surprising[ly]” many 
courts and state legislatures have adopted, and thus “[l]ogic and contemporary practice sup-
port . . . [this] longstanding and rational distinction”). 
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changes through the political process.245  The Court doesn’t mention this crit-
ical question.  Indeed, the only Glucksberg brief to address it was the amicus brief 
filed in support of the Washington law by the Oregon Attorney General.246 
E.  Practices of Religious Minorities Not Protected by the Free Exercise Clause 
In Employment Division v. Smith (the “Peyote case”), the Court held that the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment did not preclude an Oregon 
law that seriously impaired religious practices, as long as the prohibition 
was motivated by a secular purpose and not applied in a discriminatory 
manner.247  Our political process approach suggests that a different result 
might be achieved under the Due Process Clause by some religious groups, 
if they can show the requisite prejudice precluding their access to the politi-
cal process.  This is particularly true where stereotypes or prejudice may 
apply to the particular religious practices involved.  Indeed, we believe the 
Peyote case provides a compelling illustration. 
Almost all religious groups are minorities.  Yet in many cases, religious 
groups exemplify Justice Stone’s insight about the ability of minority groups 
to redress grievances politically.  Ordinary state and federal legislation often 
requires government to specifically accommodate religious groups.  For ex-
ample:  Congress enacted an explicit statute to this effect after the Smith deci-
sion;248 Oregon, like many states, exempted the use of wine in religious ritu-
	
 245 Indeed, Washington voters enacted a Death with Dignity Act in 2008, with the support of the 
incumbent governor.  Washington Death with Dignity Act: A History, DEATH WITH DIGNITY, 
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/washington-death-with-dignity-act-history (last visited Feb. 
15, 2018).  Oregon voters had previously enacted such legislation in 1997.  Death with Dignity 
Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.800–127.897 (West 2017).  To date, two state legislatures have 
revised their statutes to permit some form of physician-assisted suicide.  End of Life Option Act, 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443 (West 2016); Patient Choice at End of Life, VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5281–93 (West 2013). 
 246 The brief provided: 
Unlike state laws that may be subject to more careful scrutiny because of their impact on 
racial, national, religious or other discrete subgroups, Washington’s ban on assisted sui-
cide affects all citizens equally.  Death eventually comes to each of us, and each of us 
may face difficult end-of-life decisions for ourselves and for loved ones.  Precisely for that 
reason, there is no basis to assume that the legislative choice made by Washington dis-
proportionately impacts any group of citizens or is the result of malicious or benign dis-
crimination against any group.  Cf. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (invalidating 
Colorado law as failing to further legitimate state objectives, thus violating the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, because the law was motivated only by hostility and maliciousness toward 
a segment of the State’s citizens). 
  Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Oregon in Support of Petitioners State of Washington, et al. at 
11–12, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110). 
 247 494 U.S. 872, 878, 882 (1990).  One of us has extensively criticized this decision on First 
Amendment grounds beyond the scope of this Article.  CHOPER, LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 2–3. 
 248 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). 
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als from normal limits on alcohol sale and distribution;249 the federal gov-
ernment and many states likewise exempt the use of peyote when used in re-
ligious rituals.250  Our suggested inquiry, under the Due Process Clause, 
would be whether Oregonians desiring to use peyote for religious rituals 
were blocked by prejudice from the political process.  Evidence of animus 
directed at Native Americans, or fears that users were part of unpopular 
“subcultures,” would support more searching judicial scrutiny.  In contrast, 
substantial evidence that use of a drug subject to recreational abuse could 
not be meaningfully contained to religious users would justify a conclusion 
that the decision reflected strong public policy rather than prejudice.   
In general, courts should ask why a claimant was not able to prevail leg-
islatively.  Active animus, as well as evidence that the claimant group was so 
small in number that they could be effectively ignored in respect to the sub-
stantive issue alleged, despite the strong impact on their own lives, supports 
the invocation of Footnote Four to justify closer judicial scrutiny. 
CONCLUSION 
Any constitutional democracy faces the challenge of reconciling legisla-
tive choices made by elected representatives or their designees and the abil-
ity of unelected judges to invalidate these choices.  American constitutional 
history shows that the role of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Consti-
tution faced a unique crisis in the 1930s, when a series of laws enacted by 
elected officials were jeopardized by judicially-developed interpretations of 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses that allowed courts to inval-
idate laws based on the Justices’ personal economic philosophy.  America’s 
unique resolution of the “counter-majoritarian dilemma” was articulated in 
the landmark Carolene Products decision.  In that case, the Court held that 
courts should ordinarily review challenged legislation with great deference.  
However, Justice Stone went on to reserve careful non-deferential judicial 
scrutiny for cases where the political process itself could not be relied upon, 
due to prejudice or other failings, to adequately protect those unfairly af-
fected by improvident legislation. 
	
 249 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 471.410(4) (West 2014) (specifically exempting sacramental wine given or 
provided as part of a religious rite or service); OR. ADMIN. R. 845-010-0300 (2017) (allowing reli-
gious organizations to obtain a free permit to import sacramental wine). 
250 See 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2017) (“The listing of peyote as a controlled substance in Schedule I does 
not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religious ceremonies of the Native American 
Church . . . .”).  For a list of states, see Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 n.2 (Or. 1988). 
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This resolution responds to the specific context of American constitu-
tional politics.  Justices have generally expressed a faith in the legitimacy of 
the political process.  Nonetheless, from the Lochner era, through the War-
ren Court’s recognition of new substantive due process claims, to the Rob-
erts Court, our history features decisions that seem to turn radically on the 
ideological preferences of a majority of the Justices.  Carolene Products seeks 
to channel the judicial focus in a manner less reliant on personal ideology. 
These concerns may not be present in other constitutional democracies.  
For example, the 1996 South African Constitution is explicitly built on a 
compromise, quite different than the problem that Alexander Bickel and 
other American scholars addressed.  Its framers created a constitutional text 
that is both broad and detailed, to be enforced by a new Constitutional 
Court.  This compromise reflected the distrust of the white minority in the 
national legislature, sure to be dominated by the African National Con-
gress, as well as a particular trust in the first court, to be composed entirely 
of nominees of the first President of a democratic Republic of South Africa, 
Nelson Mandela.251  Coming nearly two centuries after constitutional re-
view by judges was established in the United States, this reflected a deliber-
ate policy choice to vest considerable discretion in the judiciary to mediate 
and demand justifications from a majoritarian political process that had 
never existed in their nation.  These circumstances are quite different than 
those encountered in American constitutional politics.  Although these and 
other jurisdictions struggle, as does any constitutional democracy, with 
questions about the legitimacy of judicial review, these responses illustrate 
the unique context in which the issues arise given each country’s history 
and constitutional politics.   
Over time, our Court has not been rigorous or precise in tying its active 
scrutiny of challenges under the Due Process Clauses to the theory of Carolene 
Products.  We propose a return to the roots of modern constitutional theory in 
two ways.  First, courts should avoid many due process claims by directing 
that judges first analyze constitutional challenges to legislation under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  Second, the appropriate test for heightened scruti-
ny of equality claims should focus on whether the claimant cannot secure a 
redress of grievances from the political process, through the normal “wheel-
ing and dealing” between multiple interest groups with multiple interests that 
ordinarily characterize the business of Congress and state legislatures.  Third, 
	
 251 See HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM AND SOUTH AFRICA’S 
POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION 179–80 (2000) (differentiating between apartheid era courts and 
the new Constitutional Court appointed with “impeccable anti-apartheid credentials”); STEPHEN 
ROSS, HELEN IRVING, HEINZ KLUG, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560 (2014) (ex-
plaining Mandela’s appointment of the initial Constitutional Court). 
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for substantive due process claims of general application, courts should limit 
such scrutiny to those claimants whose decision to exercise their liberties 
form, on the basis of that choice, a minority such that majoritarian political 
processes cannot protect them. Where claimants disadvantaged by legislation 
can form political factions capable of combining with others to redress their 
grievances politically, courts should decline to intervene. 
 
